


*A fortnightly of facts and ideas*

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July 5, 1949

# The Reporter

A fortnightly of facts and ideas

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Volume 1, No. 6

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*The Reporter* considers that this country's most urgent task—and wonderful opportunity—is to build a truly democratic relationship among labor, management, and government, in which each respects the autonomy and responsibilities of the other. That is why it supports trade unions and collective bargaining, and hopes that workers will take an ever-increasing share in the debate that must determine the conditions under which they and the nation will live. That is how they can best prove their active citizenship.

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## Editorial

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It seems certain now: the representatives of management as well as the representatives of labor will be required to sign non-Communist affidavits if they want to use the facilities of the NLRB. By making the non-Communist affidavit compulsory on both sides, Congress has challenged the presumption that only labor holds within itself potential threats to our freedom. In the same way, as an evidence of that august fairness that is becoming to the rule of law, a non-Fascist pledge will be requested of the representatives of management and labor. This urge for symmetry runs against an obstacle: Do we know what Fascism is and how it can be defined? Is Fascism still a danger to our democratic order, or just a name that we use to remove the taint of indiscriminate Red-baiting from our anti-totalitarian execrations?

Yet just ten years ago everybody could see for himself what Fascism was and what solution it had given to the problems of labor-management relations. It was enough to cross the ocean, go to Italy, and look at what then was called the corporate state. In fact, quite a number of Americans went, the best-known leaders of business, of politics, and of education. They saw things with their own eyes; they asked for explanations that were liberally given by genial and personable Fascist officials; and, if they cared to, they interviewed Mussolini. Having seen and heard, most of them concluded: It works.

The idea of the corporate state had been first concocted by a handful of labor organizers and big industrialists, under the auspices of Fascist politicians who, through some accident of Italian politics, found themselves in 1925 in absolute control of the country. All these men, aside from a most unscrupulous care for their own welfare, had in common one basic belief: Big government,

big business, and big labor can strengthen each other and establish a complete monopoly of power, each in its own realm. The monopolistic and compulsory organizations of the employees and the monopolistic and compulsory organizations of the employers granted each other exclusive bargaining powers under the guarantee of the government that had become the monopoly of one party. What was called "the corporation" was the three-sided partnership of government, business, and labor—a pattern that was supposed to work all through the national economy, from the smallest unit of production and distribution to the supreme governmental agencies of central planning.

Under the corporate system, judges in the courts of law were supposed to settle the conflicts between labor and management, for, it was said, in a well-ordered state the rule of the law, supported eventually by the police power, makes obsolete such old-fashioned tests of strength as strikes and lockouts. Having been deprived of the right to strike, the workers were offered in compensation a broad system of social insurance covering the risks of unemployment, sickness, and old age. The government paid particular attention to child welfare, maternity care, and the workers' leisure time. The citizen's right to vote in free elections was neglected, but not the right to have fun. Indeed, the corporate state was all things to all people: it claimed to be a welfare state and at the same time its planned economy offered guaranteed returns to capitalistic investments.

When the social reforms of the New Deal were introduced in the United States, the Fascist newspapers were swept by gales of regimented laughter. For, they said, Roosevelt is copying us and how belatedly, and how inadequately. The hilarity was especially uproarious at the beginning of the New



Deal when the NRA tried to revive the economy of the nation by bringing together the representatives of government, management, and labor.

Now it's all over; the corporate state is nothing more than an uncomfortable memory for many Italians and non-Italians. We all know now that it was riddled with corruption and that most of its imposing structure was just a façade for the rule of a self-appointed, self-perpetuating oligarchy. It must be added, however, that the corporate state collapsed because Mussolini lost the war. It was not overthrown by popular revolution. Had Mussolini acted like his disciple and protégé, Francisco Franco, had he, as Roosevelt and Churchill begged him to, stayed out of the war, the corporate state would probably still be a sight to be seen and Mussolini, in the best of health, would be busy establishing bridges between East and West. Moreover, the principles of the corporate state are still cherished by the followers of Franco and Perón.

In the United States we are determined to steer a course between the Communist Scylla and the Fascist Charybdis. The Communist rocks are overwhelmingly visible and, indeed, many people are so hypnotically absorbed in gazing at them that they lose all sense of perspective and proportion. But the Fascist whirlpool cannot be seen by the naked eye. We know even too well the tides that lead to Moscow, but we have only a hazy notion of the ones sweeping toward the now-submerged ruins of the corporate state. Perhaps Fascism never did so much harm to us as in its tragic and ludicrous disappearance.

We are still fascinated by the memory of the late Fascist leaders who appear to us as inhuman examples of unsurpassed wickedness. Yet we must realize that these evil men gave a hasty and fraudulent expression to potentialities that are inherent in the conditions of our times. Mussolini did not invent the trend toward bigness—he simply found out, in a moment of personal emergency, that big government can be strengthened by big business and big labor. He was not the one who started the drive toward monopoly—monopoly of labor, or of business, or of government. Finally, he was not the first social pacifist who thought that

economic or class conflicts could be settled by the rule of law supported by police force. Of course, he thought of himself as the law—which is a minor claim to originality.

Nothing would be more absurd now than trying to find the potential American equivalent of Mussolini or Hitler. There is no use starting a witch-hunt on the Right. But there is considerable use in watching the way of all bigness—be it in business, in labor, or in government. When one helps another, and one leans on another, then there is danger ahead. In spite of John L. Lewis's frowning and his verbiage, it would be absurd to call him a Fascist. However, we have reason to be alarmed whenever we see collusion between representatives of capital and representatives of labor, who in order to stabilize a whole industry grant each other exclusive bargaining powers.

The defense against the threat of Fascism is not in the artificial cultivation of smallness. Rather, it is in the greatest possible popular participation



in the internal life of each one of the big three, which means democracy in labor, open competition in business, militant partisanship in politics.

The greatest danger of bigness in government lies, perhaps, not in its executive but in its legislative branch. For the executive and administrative agencies are made and can be unmade by Congress, but the real threat to our institutions is Big Law—over-extended

law—that tries to legislate what goes beyond the limits of enforceable legislation. The threat may come with the best of motives from the best of men—men who, inspired by social pacifism, want to put under the control of the courts some of the crude conflicts between management and labor that under our system can be solved only by tests of strength and by collective bargaining.

From this viewpoint the Taft-Hartley Act cannot be called a Fascist law any more than it can be called a Communist law. It does not outlaw strikes or lockouts. It does not give sole bargaining power to any particular nationwide organization of the workers. But with its sprawling provisions it is an example of what may be called over-legislation. Over-legislation either discredits the law of the land when unenforced, or harms the interests and sometimes the freedoms of the citizens when enforced.

There is a point in the legal system of every democratic nation at which conflicts that affect too large a number of people or involve interests of too great a magnitude cannot be settled by the rule of law, even if the law is supported by police power—unless, of course, the police power prevails and democracy is given up. This applies eminently to labor-management conflicts that frequently disturb the community but that only in case of extreme national danger can be forcibly settled by the national government. The price for a uniform rule of law, strong enough to settle all labor-management conflicts, is the corporate state.

It must be rather difficult to draft a non-Fascist affidavit, considering that the dangers of Fascism may come from so many quarters and are centered nowhere. Perhaps something like this could do: "I do not believe in bigness. I think that big labor, big business, and big government can and must be checked. I believe that when the three bignesses get too chummy, one helping the other to get bigger, then the danger of Fascism is upon us. I pledge myself to uphold the fullest operation of the competitive system in business, in labor, and in politics."

Incidentally, Congress, too, as a guarantee against the temptation of over-legislating might take the non-Fascist oath.

# Beck and Reuther

*The Teamsters are engaged in straight business unionism;  
the Auto Workers seek political reform as well as good pay*

Two men are competing for the loyalty of the American worker today—Dave Beck, executive vice-president and *de facto* head of the AFL Teamsters, who rules a barony of a million organized workers, and Walter Reuther, president of the UAW Auto Workers, who directs an aggressively independent labor republic of the same size. These two, who have built what are now the two

largest unions in the world, have, by their taste and capacity for power, become the outstanding contenders for the control of most of the American labor movement.

Each has perfected his own form of unionism, almost exactly opposite in conception, but equally able to get results. Of the two systems, Beck's is the easier to define. It is "business union-

ism," bare of sentimentality, indifferent to democracy and history. Beck, in his own words, is "in the business of selling labor." Since he believes that "labor cannot prosper unless business is given reasonable and adequate protection," he organizes employers and workers, brooks no nonsense from either, and sets prices as well as wages. "I get the boys wages and conditions, and I keep the boss in business," he says. "What else should they want?"

Reuther assumes that workers do want something else. His union offers them not only decent paychecks, but intellectual enlightenment, social equality and civic honor, political liberation and economic reform. He confronts the employer as a classic adversary, whose profit margin must be reduced; he is for redistributing the national wealth. No question is too big for Reuther to bargain about, no issue outside his province. His formula, as a close friend of his points out, "is that at the same time that he raises the workers' wages, he raises their aim as well."

In recruiting and holding their members, the two men have few methods in common. Beck approaches the teamster as a member of a privileged class. His union's objective, as stated in its constitution, is to "organize under one banner all workmen engaged in the craft and . . . to teach our membership the advantage, benefits and importance of their industrial position."

The advantages of the teamsters' "industrial position" are manifold. Beck has enlarged the union, which started with truck drivers, to include bus drivers, auto salesmen, cannery workers, brewers, and warehousemen. He hopes eventually to take in "everybody who handles anything that is moved." (From this vantage point



Dave Beck

Beck looks down at Reuther as being "very able, but parochial . . . he just has one industry to play with").

One of Dave Beck's habits is to stabilize his industries by organizing employers into associations of which his union functionaries are frequently the executive secretaries. Under such circumstances, it is a simple matter to see to it that no worker who does not hold a Teamsters' Union card gets a job in an association shop.

Once Beck wins the workers, he keeps them, as a grudging admirer has said, "by telling them to close their eyes and hold out their hands." What democratic institutions the union has have either been suppressed or died of neglect. In a sworn statement before the National Labor Relations Board, a Teamsters' Union member named Jack Patterson described his union's procedure this way:

"Since 1945, when I started attending meetings, there has been only one so-called election of officers. At a regular meeting in 1947, as I recall, Brewster [Beck's lieutenant in Seattle] announced, 'We have three officers to re-elect—O'Reilly, Cavano, and Joe Francis—all in favor say Aye.' Half the men said Aye and some didn't vote."

Patterson then went on to say: "I have never seen a man thrown out of a meeting for [opposing] the officials, except once upon an excuse of drunkenness. It was Big Andy and he had been drinking and interrupted a speaker . . . He was thrown out and someone ran out in the hall and hit him, knocking out all his teeth; and he now wears false ones. It is not necessary for them to throw a member out; they merely take the floor away from a speaker, on four pretexts: 1. He doesn't know what he's talking about. 2. The speaker is drunk. 3. The speaker is a Communist. 4. If the speaker had been at the last meeting he would know better. The Chair then recognizes another speaker and tells the former speaker to sit down."

Beck himself has defined how far democracy extends in his union: "We have the most democratic union in the world. But sometimes you can have too damn much democracy and it interferes with your welfare . . . and my biggest trouble comes from the elected secretaries in some locals, because since



Walter Reuther

they're elected they're not always the best men for the job. Plenty of times, I say to the boys, 'Do you want to elect your officers for this regional council or local union, or do you want me to appoint them?' More often than not, they'll say: 'You appoint them, Dave,' because they know I'll choose the best men."

There is no case on record in which a Beck man has been successfully thrown out of office. On the rare occasions when it looked as if a revolt might start, Beck has used the trusteeship provision of the constitution to quell it. The constitution permits Beck to take over a local union for an indefinite period if its officers are "dishonest or incompetent or that organization is not being conducted for the benefit of the trade." In such cases, Beck may outlaw meetings and elections altogether, and declare trusteeships which give him control.

He has, he admits, done the last "many times," notably with the taxi

drivers of Seattle who staged an unauthorized strike five years ago and have had to remain under his trusteeship ever since.

The men take it largely because he has proved he can produce. First he sees to it that employers who cannot pay a going wage do not remain in business. He once told Richard Neuberger, the magazine writer: "There are too many filling stations in Seattle . . . we're going to close some of them. First I advise promoters against starting new stations. If that doesn't work, the Teamsters' Union will simply refuse to serve them. They won't last very long after that."

With stability insured, Beck negotiates agreements with employers both as to the prices they will charge and the wages they will pay. His agreements may or may not be written, but they last a long time. (His latest contract covering laundry workers in Indianapolis will be in force for seven years.) While his wage rates vary from



industry to industry (his brewery drivers' rates are high, his cabdrivers' low), they are usually about \$1.50 an hour.

In almost every case, the increases he wins are passed on to the consumer. Beck insists that this practice does not harm the community, but Seattle, where his system is in force in laundries, cleaning establishments, groceries, dairies, and other essential services, has, next to Washington, D. C., the highest cost-of-living index in the country.

Once Beck has set the pattern in a city, he will go to great lengths to maintain it. When, for example, the grocery clerks of Los Angeles struck, against his wishes, for a considerable pay raise in 1947, "threatening the whole wage structure in Los Angeles," Beck took the side of the Employers' Association, coached it through negotiations, and fought the strike. Beck does not oppose strikes only to preserve the wage structure. In predatory raids on other unions, "in the interests of the Teamsters' jurisdiction," he has broken many other strikes, including one at Boeing Aircraft last year, when, with fifteen thousand workers of another union out, he not only sent his men through the picket lines but also, with the cooperation of the management, set up offices inside the plant to recruit strike-breakers into his union.

"It was tough at first to get my boys to cross picket lines," Beck admits, but by now the membership accepts his commands without question. He has gambled on the blunt power of the dollar to bring together and discipline a group of highly independent and individualistic workers—men who work singly or, at most, in pairs. The dollar has succeeded.

Reuther approaches his potential members from precisely the reverse premise. He appeals to the men on the assembly line who stand in danger of becoming robots. He asks them to organize not merely for the money, but for a new way of life. Clearly, Reuther has chosen a strenuous path: he under-

takes not only to sell labor to the employer, but also to sell ideas to labor.

His program is largely based on the assumption of class hostility or at least of a fundamental difference of interests between worker and employer. Rigidly excluding collusion with industry, he has frequently made brilliant use of the strike weapon, both to organize and maintain his union. Beck comments that by this method the Auto Workers "can't make up in twenty years what they lose in a couple of months." Nevertheless, since the UAW first took hold in Detroit in 1937, it has increased the



wage levels in the auto industry by 120 per cent and the real living standards of the auto workers by 53 per cent.

Reuther's organizing procedure is as well-planned as a military maneuver. He makes his approach by intensive propaganda and painstaking doorbell ringing, accompanied by sensational stories in the press. When he is ready to strike, he hits the key plant, knocking out the resistance of its satellites.

Once he has the workers, he pays careful attention to their economic gains. But almost invariably, he attaches his wage demands to broad social issues, usually revolving around "taking human welfare out of competition" and cutting into industry's profit margin. If he was not the first to raise the question of wage increases without price increases, he was the first to pin it down at the bargaining table

and make it a national issue with his phrase "Look at the books" in the 113-day General Motors strike of 1946.

It is obvious that this kind of unionism makes the union member work much harder. He is asked to take long views, often at what seems to be the expense of the cash in hand. He is expected to become an accomplice in national movements with profound social and political implications. He is required to make many decisions—on economics, engineering, sociology, politics—not all of which he is in a position to know everything about.

He is groomed for this role by the most extensive educational program developed by any union in the country. The UAW sets aside a sizable amount of money for educational work. The international alone spends three-quarters of a million dollars on education every year. It employs a full-time educational staff of thirty people (an interesting contrast with Beck, whose educational program is confined to hiring "organizers" to teach jiu-jitsu).

The UAW operates a radio station, makes films, and publishes pamphlets, newspapers, and a first-rate national magazine, *Ammunition*. It runs training schools, extension classes, bookshops, dramatic

groups, cooperatives, and welfare programs. It teaches labor history, economics, literature, civics, world politics, and Robert's rules of order. By these means it succeeds in getting greater participation of rank-and-filers in union affairs than probably any other union in the country.

This participation is at the same time Reuther's biggest strength and biggest weakness. Probably no organization in the world has a more self-conscious and elaborate machinery for democracy than Walter Reuther's auto workers. A harassed Ford executive has complained, "It is very difficult to have long-term dealings with the UAW. My God, they are having elections of one kind or another all the time!"

The addiction of the auto worker to union democracy came out strikingly

at a recent national UAW convention. Union leaders proposed to amend the constitution to provide for biennial instead of annual conventions. The motion was introduced, and all the officers on the platform, representing every political faction, spoke in favor of it. The delegates listened in silence. When the motion came to a vote, not a man from the floor voted for it.

Having, with meticulous care, made himself the symbol of democracy in his union, Reuther is caught in the equivocal position, as an observer remarks, "of having more power than almost any other man in the United States—so long as he doesn't exercise it." For since the membership, at his insistence, has come to consider self-expression their sacred right, any open exercise of arbitrary authority might end in disaster.

Nevertheless, Reuther has made full use of his position to build a smooth political machine. His weapon is white-collar patronage—a two-way technique based on the desire of the worker to escape from the assembly line to the union staff and his reluctance, once there, to be sent back again.

As for the employers who must deal with Reuther and Beck, their reactions have been mixed. Members of both men's unions in former years have used violent methods which industry doesn't easily forget. (In the Teamsters' case, they were arson, overturned trucks, and stink-bombs, for which several of their lieutenants have served long jail terms; in the UAW's case they were largely sit-down strikes.) As unionism has grown to be more or less an accepted institution, however, the memories have gradually receded.

Beck especially has become popular with management. From the time he was forced to leave high school and go to work in a laundry, Beck has had an almost pathetic desire to be respectable. And since 1937, when he finally broke the back of employer resistance, he has become eminently so. "For every enemy I've made in the labor movement since then," he once stated, "I've made a hundred friends in the Chamber of Commerce."

His efforts to curry favor among employers have gone over exceedingly well. Frank McLaughlin, president of the Puget Sound Power and Light Company, has said: "Beck is a top

labor statesman and an outstanding civic leader. He is absolutely tops." (Shortly after this statement, Beck switched his position on the State of Washington's public-power referendum, and joined with the power interests to oppose it.) In an unguarded moment, a trucking executive summed up the management attitude: "If we have to deal with any unions at all, I'll take Beck any time. Last year he cost me \$55,000 in wage increases. Any other labor leader would have cost me \$100,000."

The feeling of the auto industry officials towards Reuther is much less enthusiastic. They have, in the words of one of their executives, "gotten used to the idea of unions. But it is harder to get used to Reuther." He went on to say: "We admire Reuther and we respect him. But he's a maverick. We expect unions to cost us money. But we're not prepared to accept Reuther's extreme notion of what the scope of collective bargaining should be. We



would almost rather deal with the Communists' labor leaders—they park their politics in Washington before they come into negotiations."

As an example of this he cites the General Motors strike negotiations of 1946. At one point in their course, Reuther, who usually is careless about his language in negotiations, suddenly limited himself to immaculate prose, while the one man on GM's side who could match his racy phrases swore along as usual. After two weeks, Reu-

ther convoked a national citizens' committee to examine the issues in the strike—and gave it the transcript of the proceedings. The committee, which included many clergymen, recommended that General Motors take a less profane attitude toward negotiations.

Reuther unquestionably has plans of great dimensions. His chief ambition seems to be to succeed Philip Murray as President of the CIO, to achieve unity with the AFL, to win supreme command over both, and ultimately to lead a progressive farmer-labor party. Every one of his moves points in this direction—his establishment of cooperatives which deepen his bonds with farmers; his succession of Reuther Plans for airplanes, automobiles, and prefabricated houses; his monumental activity during last November's elections, through the CIO-PAC. Such a party, not bound to the doctrinaire socialist principles which Reuther shed long ago, but loosely held in coalition, would be peculiarly suited to his pragmatic political genius. It might take time to build. But he sees it in the cards, and at forty-two he has a lot of time.

Beck's daydreams take a different direction. Surprisingly inept at politics (his press agents admit ruefully that last November he "guessed wrong down the line") he does not think in terms of formal political power. His talent lies in trade-union organization. He is openly the heir apparent to septuagenarian Dan Tobin, who after forty-two years as president of the Teamsters' Union, has practically turned the reins over to him. From there he might jump to the head of the AFL, though his crude power methods are against him. But his real hope for supremacy lies in organizing a million and more workers that he has already marked within his limitless jurisdiction. With the stranglehold it would give him over the nation's economy, he would be content to be an all-powerful but uncrowned emperor.

Success for both men will depend on their ability to carry the workers with them. In the long run, the final decision between them will hang on the workers' choice—either to settle for Beck's measure of bread or, as a UAW song book puts it, "to fight for roses too."







# Wanted: A Labor Policy

*What our government can do and what it cannot do in the settlement of management-labor differences*

The prodigious growth of unions during the last decade has raised a variety of problems—and abuses—which our law-makers seem to consider a test of their ingenuity. The impulse to “do something” about labor has been strong—strongest among those who, in other matters, favor confining government action to the narrowest possible limits.

The emergence of organized labor as a powerful force does inevitably raise the need for new laws; but even more urgently it raises the need for new policy. The singling out of practices and institutions which are considered offensive—and the application of piecemeal legal remedies—does not meet this requirement. To be consistent and workable, policy must be coherent and long-range. Above all, policy must demonstrate an acute awareness of the practicable limits of governmental power.

The authors of the Taft-Hartley law are sometimes accused of having been motivated by a simple desire to destroy the unions. But the valid accusation is not so much that they had a bad policy as that they tended to have no policy at all. They had a set of grievances and worries, and in the authority of the Federal government they believed they had a cure for everything.

The abolition of the closed shop and the prohibition of featherbedding show what happens when legislative fiat comes up against a deep-rooted, complex social difficulty. On grounds of pure democratic theory a case can certainly be made out against the closed shop; and performance of work that is not needed (or payment for work that is not done) is morally indefensible and as contrary to the workers' interest as to management's. Yet there are reasons to explain the existence of these institutions. Regardless of law, labor

and management have continued in large measure to deal with them by bargaining.

When the fear of technological unemployment has been answered in a way that is convincing to the average worker—and only then—featherbedding will be eliminated. When the demands for union security have been met, the closed shop will give way to more voluntary associations. In the meantime, the framers of labor law need hardly feel compelled to crack down righteously on every departure from their ideal.

After all, there are many institutions, including churches and business corporations, which are not constituted according to perfect democratic principles. There are many evils as bad as featherbedding which the law, however reluctantly, admits itself powerless to eliminate at one blow.

If it is not to enforce an abstract moral code, what, then, is the aim of labor policy? Basically it is the same as most legislation within a democratic community: to balance power between groups, to adjust their rights, so that they can then settle their own differences and achieve a stable equilibrium.

In the case of laws affecting the relationship between unions and managements this task is especially clear. We are committed to the settlement of industrial disputes by the process of collective bargaining; and the aim of law must be to see that collective bargaining is made as effective as possible.

Without a rough equality of power, bargaining is impossible. The first attempt to frame a national labor policy took place at a time when labor was still largely unorganized and had been weakened by the depression. The Wagner Act set as its goal the encourage-

ment of unionization. It was avowedly one-sided, insofar as one side at the bargaining table needed special strengthening and support. Unfortunately this one-sidedness was not in due time modified so as to redress the balance, but was countered by vindictive efforts to get tough with labor.

Today there is no need to put props under the unions, as there is certainly no call for punitive attacks. What is required is a reasonable, simple, and entirely lucid charter, freeing the bargaining process from all forms of unnecessary interference, withdrawing the reach of government from areas where it has been unwisely extended, and measuring separate provisions against the test of whether or not they further collective bargaining.

It is not necessary to introduce perfectionism into the making of labor law, or to insist upon absolute adherence to a single principle. Nevertheless, the burden of proof is upon those who would extend the area covered by such legislation.

The purpose (unrelated to collective bargaining) for which labor legislation is most frequently invoked is the protection of union members against the presumed excesses of their leaders. The desire to see democratic rights and democratic methods observed within the union is strong among the public. It may be asked, nevertheless, why the internal organization of unions should be singled out for such regulation.

The publication of financial accounts is a safeguard which could well be insisted on—though such accounts are of little practical use until a formula is found which reflects the union's activities and is intelligible to the rank and file. The filing of non-Communist oaths can also be a protection to the membership, though its importance is

overrated. In time a kind of bill of rights for union members should become standard, developed out of the unions' inner experience with democracy, and sanctioned by government.

In general the lawmakers are inclined to show too tender a solicitude for the union member. Many provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act are clearly based on the assumption that the individual member is held in the union by force, and is continually trying to escape the leader's sway. It need scarcely be said that that assumption leads to bad legislation.

A second extension of labor law arises from the temptation to determine what issues can be bargained over and what cannot. It is a temptation almost invariably to be resisted. The widest possible scope should be left the two parties, with legislative interference only where, because of bigness or some other consideration, the public interest is clearly affected.

Where labor and management have worked out, over the years, arrangements which serve their common interests or which help preserve industrial peace, a legal definition of "unfair practices" is not likely to effect a change. The typographical unions have not been called into court for even the most obvious of "made work" practices. The hiring hall in the maritime unions—a form of closed shop—continues in many ports.

The impulse to define by law the content of collective bargaining is strengthened by management's fear that labor is going to encroach on its prerogatives. The fear is exaggerated. Labor in this country has, in the main, had enough trouble trying to participate in decisions which directly involve the workers, their working conditions, and terms of employment.

Walter Reuther, it is true, insisted in the recent Ford strike that the rate of production cannot be left to management's discretion, even when health and safety are not at issue. John L. Lewis is at present attempting to impose on the Southern mine owners a "share-the-work" plan. Such examples are seized on by management as proof of labor's resolve to take over the whole show. But these are controversial outposts of precisely the kind to be settled by bargaining.

The restricting of labor legislation

to the field of collective bargaining is challenged, again, by strikes that imperil the national health and safety. In this field above all, it is argued, the responsibilities of government must be defined by law. There is no doubt that government cannot stand by while an essentially private dispute is allowed to disrupt the economy or transport of the nation. Yet there remains a question as to how much can be done specifically by a labor law, and how much must be left to the inherent powers which government possesses.

The lawmakers, it may be noted, have tended to be so preoccupied with the stopping of dangerous strikes that they have actually hindered, rather than helped, collective bargaining. Focusing on some procedural device or on the resounding injunction, they have forgotten the chief end toward which their efforts should be bent. The Taft-Hartley requirement that a union vote on the employer's last offer has, for example, clearly been a disruptive influence in the search for agreement.

The first aim of legislation—in national strikes as in all others—is to stimulate a settlement through collective bargaining. Where the price of failure is so high, special techniques and aid may be introduced. Mediation must be used to the fullest advantage. Public opinion must be concentrated behind possible solutions. Every provision against hasty action must be taken.

It is possible, of course, that the best efforts and the most carefully devised machinery will fail. The country is then faced by a disruption it cannot passively tolerate. What is it to do? It must do, fundamentally, what it has done in every crisis of its existence—fall back upon the sovereign powers of the state, wielded with as much sensitivity, determination, and skill as leaders can muster.

One of the best features of the Taft-Hartley Act was that, having provided at length for such a diversity of conditions, it was silent when it came to the last great test of all. If the eight-day cooling-off period expired with no accord reached, the dispute went back to the public authorities, without benefit of further instructions from the law.

The public never quite grasped this, assuming that there must somewhere be a power permanently to enjoin a

strike. But the public forgot what the wisest legislators know instinctively—that when the fundamental interests of the community are jeopardized the total power of the government must be brought into play. Then a sense of daring and a sense of timing, the adroit use of surprises—above all, the feeling for power and an awareness of power's inherent limitations—are more valuable than all the injunctions that may be written in the statute book.

How are we to assume that the results gained around the bargaining table will conform to the public interest? The outsider, thinking in terms of class warfare, tends to put too great an emphasis on conflict in labor-management relations; he fears a purely arbitrary decision may emerge from the power struggle. But the greater danger under modern conditions is that the protagonists will join forces at the expense of the consumer.

The urge toward peace is as strong as that toward war; and in the compromises which industry often willingly accepts, it is peace at any price. The increased costs, that is, are passed on. Labor and management lie down like the Scriptural lion and the lamb—and the public pays the bill.

The tendency is most developed in those areas of the economy where bigness—both big unions and big business—is the rule. Strategic cooperation, as in glass or steel, coincides with a position which makes it possible to set the price structure of the whole industry. The consumer, the one party who might have introduced a strong element of dissent into the negotiations, is absent from the bargaining table.

The check upon this tendency lies partially in the fact that labor is an important part of the public and is also the nation's principal consumer. A wage increase of a program of social benefits will be weighed by labor against the price increases they cause. Labor economists can argue that increased purchasing power will mean a large production and a consequent fall in unit price. But when the test is upon a specific issue, these long-range arguments are likely to give way. This is true particularly to the extent that labor leaders are anxious to bring the price-conscious workers in the white-collar class to their side.

In the long run a national wage pol-

## The Mythology of Bargaining

icy will, almost inevitably, serve as a guide to individual negotiations. The wage decisions reached by bargaining are already legislative in character—a delegation of authority permitted within wide limits. But where the power of setting wages falls to a comparatively few industries, or even to a few individuals, the government itself must inject its influence. Labor governments act naturally along such lines; and a government like our own, ruling amid a concentration of power in business and labor, can hardly refrain completely.

The formal methods and instrumentalities for shaping a wage policy and at the same time preserving collective bargaining have not been worked out. A conference of employers and labor leaders, like that held shortly after the war, has not been effective. Hardly more successful has been the influence over the wage pattern achieved through government's intervention in national-emergency strikes. But these are by no means final experiments toward an aim that is everywhere crucial in the democratic process: the unhampered determination of individual cases, brought into harmony with the general interest.

Indeed, it is because collective bargaining conforms to the method of settling disputes throughout a democratic society that we can, in the last analysis, have faith in it as a principle. The existence of diverse groups and interests, embodying valid claims, free so far as possible to order their own lives and determine their actions, yet all bound by an acceptance of basic values—this is the material out of which we have had to construct a nation and to create peace among ourselves. Collective bargaining brings us problems on a new scale; but they are not essentially different problems from those we have been contending with in all fields of our social life.

More specifically, faith in collective bargaining rests upon an understanding of American labor today. A movement come to maturity, unionism stands among the vital forces that shape our national life. It deserves a freedom commensurate with its responsibility; it needs laws which are not designed to harass or frustrate it, but to set the framework for a continuous adjustment of interests between itself and the forces of business.

It would seem that the collection of ideas about labor-management "warfare" entertained by most Americans includes a good many dramatic, and somewhat far-fetched, myths. That, at least, is the implied conclusion of a report entitled *Labor and Management Look at Collective Bargaining: A Canvas of Leaders' Views*, published recently by the Twentieth Century Fund. The pamphlet contains the views—private, frank, and anonymous—of 140 men—high officers of the strongest labor unions and the largest corporations in the country.

On most issues, the report shows, management has just as much faith in collective bargaining, once the initial dose has been gulped, as the unions. Both fundamentally believe that rough but satisfactory justice is usually its result. The fact shows up, among other places, in the opposition of both camps to the Reuther-General Motors formula of tying wages to the cost-of-living index. "To 'tie to' something," said one business official, "is a dream of labor politicians. Employees don't want it. They're interested in what they take home in their pay envelopes." What they take home is decided not by a formula but by bargaining.

Indeed, the respect of both management and labor for the collective-bargaining process probably exceeds that of the public at large. The public's special concern in the past few years has been that management was being treated shabbily. Witness the Taft-Hartley Act. But management, at least in this report, apparently fails to share that anxiety. When asked, "All things considered, are bargaining relations with unions getting better or worse?" management representatives answered "better" by a score of 49-14.

Perhaps the "warfare" is no great warfare. After all, only the unsettled issues cause strikes, and only the strikes

create the headlines. The report concludes that "Contrary to the impression usually given . . . management and labor . . . more often agree than disagree. They appear to recognize their responsibilities toward each other even while doing their best to advance their own causes."

One of the more interesting sets of reactions recorded in the pamphlet is that to union welfare schemes. Management is overwhelmingly against them. Oddly enough, one argument is that such plans supposedly impair a company's labor-attracting power. ("The men will gravitate to the job that pays the most money . . . You let it be known that one company is paying ten cents an hour more than anybody else and the men run to it.") Another, perhaps more valid, points out that welfare schemes add a fixed, irreducible element to costs. ("A permanent tax.") A third, which seems to have come out of the "free enterprise" philosophy, runs: "It is up to the workers—many of whom have secured their own welfare protection—to decide what they want to do with their money."


Some employers, and more union leaders, also claim that it is for government, not unions, to assume responsibility in the welfare sphere. However, as the more venturesome labor organizations push a wider and wider variety of issues onto the conference table, a bizarre switch in attitude sometimes emerges: Management—usually intolerant of government "meddling" in business affairs—says, "Let government do it," and labor replies, "No, let us do it—just us two, by negotiation."

In general, the report shows that the lines of division stand, not simply as capital vs. labor, but as labor vs. labor, or capital vs. capital—and sometimes even as labor and capital vs. The Rest.



# Union War in Bessemer

*Klansmen, Communists, Negroes, Catholics, and steelworkers are issues in a violent struggle of labor against labor*



Labor leaders know all about parliamentary procedure; they have to. Radio stations have signs all over the place requesting "Silence," and usually people waiting to go on the air pace silently up and down reading their scripts. But in Bessemer, Alabama, Station WJLD recently had to call in the police. Some labor leaders awaiting their turns at the microphone had come to blows.

When the fight was over, Maurice Travis, secretary-treasurer of the left-wing Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union, cto, was taken to the hospital where his right eye had to be extracted. According to witnesses, Travis was knocked down and kicked in the face by men who had seceded from his union.

That evening of April 20, 1949, in the Bessemer radio station, spokesmen for both sides were waiting to make last-minute broadcasts before union elections that were to take place next day. They clashed physically in a local and brutal manifestation of the same conflict that, on higher levels, expresses itself in cto conventions more politely—in motions, amendments, and speeches.

The Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union follows the Communist line. Tra-

vis was fighting to hold it together and save it from falling victim to Philip Murray's anti-Communist Southern Organizing Drive. The group that had seceded from Mine, Mill was attempting to lure away its membership, the employees of the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company. The secessionists won the fight in the studio and they went on to win the fight for votes.

In the returns the next day the secessionists defeated the Mine, Mill union by a vote of 2,696 to 2,233. Shortly afterward they affiliated with Philip Murray's United Steelworkers.

Apart from the final eye-gouging performance in the radio station, the election in which the United Steelworkers wrested representation of the iron and coal workers from Mine, Mill had been preceded by some extremely questionable business.

Both sides have hurled serious charges against each other and, from the talk in Bessemer and Birmingham (twelve miles north-northeast along Highway 11), it appears that the allegations were not empty or extravagant. Race and religious prejudices were appealed to; intimidation and violence employed; some people around Bessemer gave the whole controversy a bitter name—"Operation Terror."

Bessemer is a workingman's town, and reflects its population's long subordination to the red iron mines in the

mountains just outside the town and to the mills and smelters in the valley. It is not a pretty, or a cheerful, place in which to live. Dime stores, chain groceries, cash-and-carry stores, credit jewelers, and loan agencies fill shabby buildings that need repair and paint. There are many towns like Bessemer all across the country and in them labor politics is not something that you go in for politely, or for fun.

When the Wagner Act was read and studied in Bessemer, the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company encouraged its employees to join independent unions which, after a while, the workers, not surprisingly, found to be company-dominated. After the recession in 1937 a cto union, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, succeeded in obtaining bargaining rights for the company's properties in the area. It played a hard trade-union game; it won reinstatement and \$102,500 in back pay for 150 workers who had been dismissed, the first portal-to-portal retroactive pay, and promotions for Negroes. Some Negroes even rose to section foremen. There was no discrimination in the mines for which the union could be blamed. It defended the workers' interests, it had their support, and, in political matters, it followed the Communist line. When a union is doing its job on the spot, the rank and file tend not to care what line its high officials are following. The trouble comes when a union, Com-



munist or not, gets thinking about all sorts of matters that have nothing to do with its job on the spot.

Four or five years ago Mine, Mill began to lose the united support of its membership. In Bessemer, as throughout the country, people began to think in terms of right and left. At least that is what a reporter is told today. All he can do is to take down the testimony. It is, of course, contradictory.

In an office above an investment brokerage firm in Birmingham, Rube Farr, director of District 36 of the United Steelworkers, the man in charge of the cio's drive to get rid of the Mine, Mill union, said that four or five years ago the officers of five Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company locals had come to him. "We're sick and tired," they said, "of being run by party-liners. The international is so busy spreading Communist propaganda they don't pay much attention to our grievances. We'd rather go without a contract than have one under Mine, Mill."

Nothing was done; the protests, according to Farr, continued. Last fall, when the international tried to get contributions for the Wallace campaign from Mine, Mill locals, most of the members got so angry, still according to Farr, that he decided that the time had come to "relieve" them of their leadership. That meant simply that the United Steelworkers (cio) moved in to destroy Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (cio). It meant simply one more battle in Philip Murray's Southern campaign.

Farr insisted that his union, the United Steelworkers, had fought and won fairly. As a minister is "called" to a

church, so they had been "called" to build "an American union based on American principles and cio policy."

It soon appeared that the call was not unanimous. Farr, Nick Zonarich, who had been brought from Pittsburgh to help, John W. Playfair, who was put on a recruiting job, and the Bessemer secessionists found that they were involved in a bitter electoral campaign. Farr says they received threatening phone calls telling them to stay away from Mine, Mill workers. He accuses Mine, Mill of bringing in the racial issue by accusing the Steelworkers of wanting to make their locals "white men's" organizations. He says his opponents spread malicious lies about Phil Murray's union—contradictory lies at that. "The Mine, Mill people," he says, "accused us of bringing in the Klan. Then they said we were run by Catholics."

The defeated Mine, Mill people tell a different story. Frank Allen, a Negro representative of the Mine, Mill union, says: "The guys who quit our union Red-baited us; they scared our people. Years ago our locals let in the leaders of the old company-dominated unions—we call them 'popsicle' unions because the company gave them popsicles at pre-election picnics—and it is these popsicle boys who led the movement to split us wide open. They went after the white men first. They did not want any colored people around until just before the election. That's when they think about colored people. They asked Asbury Howard—he's a Negro representative too—and me to come to their meeting. But we weren't fooled."


Another Mine, Mill member—not a Negro—says the same thing about his

experience with certain secessionists: "They cut my telephone; they tried to run me off the road. I recognized them. They all used to belong with us. I wasn't the only one threatened. It happened to a whole bunch of us. They told us we ought to get out of Mine, Mill and make a real white man's union. They said we'd get plenty if we kept on trying to keep the workers in line."

Another rank and flier in Bessemer had a more curious attitude. "I'll tell you what's happened," he said, "I don't like the Reds and I guess there are plenty of Reds in Mine, Mill. But I don't like Catholics either. The Steelworkers Union is run by Catholics. Why should I pay dues to support the Catholic church?"

So there you have it. Those workers who did not vote for the secession movement—and there are large numbers who remained faithful to Mine, Mill—are bitter. They say that Mine, Mill was betrayed from within, invaded from Pittsburgh.

During the election campaign, officers of the United Steelworkers in Pittsburgh denied vehemently that they had promised charters in the union to seceding Mine, Mill locals. However, organizers from the Steelworkers were at work all through the campaign; the cio had proclaimed a Southern Organizing Drive; Mine, Mill was a dissident element in Philip Murray's cio which had logically to be reduced; and after



the elections it was with United Steelworkers that the secessionists affiliated.

Whether or not Mine, Mill leadership was Communist is immaterial. It followed the party line in denouncing the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact. It could hardly have expected that it could escape involvement in the cio Southern Organizing drive. The national cio had every right to oppose Mine, Mill; its only trouble was that it had a hard time getting some of its adherents in Bessemer to stick to national cio policies.

Farr of the Steelworkers admits that the Negro workers have been slower than whites to come over from Mine, Mill. He says that they are bound by personal loyalty to such Negro leaders as Allen and Howard. He knows that the Klan paraded through the streets of Bessemer the Saturday night before the elections, but he denies that the Steelworkers had anything to do with it. Farr did not consider the episode important. "It is our objective," he said, "to take in all the miners regardless of color or creed. I have repeatedly told the employees on Red Mountain that when Steelworker locals are set up their benefits extend to all workers, white and Negro alike. Anything different is a Communist lie."

Mine, Mill, however, keeps its office going in Bessemer. The Mine, Mill people think that the United Steelworkers will not be so militant now that it has won. Mechanization is coming to the mines, the Mine, Mill people say, and the companies will want white labor now that the work is becoming easier. Mine, Mill has always been intransigent on the racial question. Its defeated officers say that in the end the workers will vote for the union that serves them best. United Steelworkers agrees.

Meanwhile it is hot and humid on the streets of downtown Bessemer; it's hot where the men work getting the ore out of the mines; the work in the mills and smelters is hard. That is the way it was in Bessemer when the workers had a Communist-line union; that is the way it is now that the anti-Communist Steelworkers have come into the area. But the violence that came with the campaign presumably ended with the elections. There won't be another election, until next year at least. —ARTHUR W. HEPNER

## The Injunction, 1875 —

In a speech in Canton, Ohio, in 1922, Attorney-General Harry Daugherty, a member of Harding's "Ohio Gang," declared: "The injunction is the most humane, the most charitable, and the most prompt and effective civil proceeding known to law."

Only ten years after Daugherty's speech, Congress was compelled to curb the use of injunctions, which for decades had led to violence and bitterness between labor and capital.

The injunction against labor was applied for first in 1875, but not until the railroad strikes of the turbulent 1880's did it come into general use. The pattern was set in the Pullman strike of 1894, during which the American Railway Union, led by Eugene V. Debs, paralyzed the nation's rail transport in protest against the company's refusal to discuss grievances.

The railroads enlisted the support of President Cleveland and, at the suggestion of his Attorney-General, the U. S. attorney in Chicago secured from the Federal Circuit Court of Chicago a "blanket injunction" against the strikers' obstructing railways and holding up the mails. The order resulted in a new wave of violence and destruction. Federal troops were summoned; Debs defied the courts and was sentenced to six months in prison for contempt. In 1895, the Supreme Court upheld his sentence.

The Court's decision was portentous. It meant that on the strength of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, the national sovereignty was now extended to the whole field of labor-management disputes—and moreover, the government was now not only involved, but clearly aligned on management's side. It also meant that from then on, striking unions were held liable under the Sherman Act as being "in restraint of trade"—a principle later

extended to the use of the boycott, as in the Danbury Hatters case.

From that time on, industry awoke to the vast possibilities of the injunction as a major weapon to block the growth of unionism in America. The scope of the injunction grew to monumental proportions, with restraining clauses that Justice Frankfurter has described as having "vague and harassing significance." In the Lennon case of 1897, court restraining orders were enlarged to include all persons knowing of the issuance of the injunction, whether or not they were enjoined. In 1919, the Federal District Court of Indiana issued a decree forbidding even a *threatened* strike by the United Mine Workers.

The unrestrained use of the restraining order reached its height in the Railway Shopmen's strike of 1922, in which more than three hundred Federal injunctions were granted against the union, one of them covering more than thirty-seven typewritten pages.

From 1914 to 1933, more than eight hundred injunctions against unions were issued by New York State courts alone, and from the 1880's to 1931, a total of 1,845 injunctions were issued by the nation's courts. These are only the injunctions reported in law journals.

The implications of this practice—the evident disparity between labor and management rights before the law—brought growing demands for legislative redress. In 1914, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act outlawed injunctions against unions except to prevent "irreparable injury," but the clause was destined to be emasculated by the courts. It was not until 1932 that popular pressure and the growth of trade-union strength brought passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ending misuse of the weapon, the first effective measure to even the weight of labor and industry in the nation's courts.



# The Teeth of Taft-Hartley

*The injunction—useful in some cases—generally frustrates the unions' attempt to enlarge the area of collective bargaining*

Among the many elements of the Taft-Hartley Act, the return to the use of court injunctions is the most repellent to labor. The word injunction carries a host of infamous associations in the history of unionism. Usually when a court, often at the employers' request, issued an injunction, the human and economic aspects of the original dispute were brushed aside, and if the unions persisted in their endeavors, they were punished for contempt of court.

Despite the stigma the injunction bears from past association, the actual operation of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that in some cases justification can be found for the injunction, even though it raises obstacles to the spread of unions into unorganized plants and even though the Taft-Hartley Act professes that collective bargaining is the accepted law of the land.

There have been seven national emergency disputes since the bill was enacted. In such disputes the Attorney-General is authorized to ask for a court injunction, to run not more than eighty days, to delay a strike and provide a cooling-off period.

Three of these disputes, those in the telephone, meat-packing, and coal industries, were settled without resort to injunction. In a second coal dispute, an injunction was issued, and John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers were fined heavily for criminal contempt of court. At that time the miners were working for the government, so this, legally, was a strike of government employees, which would not have been permitted even before the Taft-Hartley Act.

In the other three disputes, the injunction ran its full course and expired, and settlement was reached afterwards—peacefully in the atomic-

energy industry, and after a couple of conflicts in the maritime industry.

The head of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service reports that while the injunction has helped prevent some crises, it has produced a warming-up rather than a cooling-off period in others.

Moreover, the record suggests that the seven disputes did not really qualify as national emergencies. They interfered more with public convenience than with national health or security. Emergency measures were taken more in fear of what the disputes might become than in recognition of what they were.

A real national emergency (a general strike, for example) will not arise perhaps more than once in a generation. In such an emergency the President would undoubtedly resort to government powers of eminent domain, use his authority as Commander-in-Chief, claim other inherent powers, and act promptly to protect the national interest. Probably some injured party would sue for damages and, a year or so later the Supreme Court might decide that the President had exceeded his constitutional rights. But as William H. Davis says, by such action the President would have first saved the nation, the Supreme Court would have then saved the Constitution, and all would be well.

Under the Taft-Hartley Act the general council of the NLRB is instructed to apply for court injunctions to stop various unfair practices, of which secondary boycotts are the most important.

A shipping company operating from Albany not long ago offered to transport truck trailers down the Hudson to New York City. The truck drivers demanded standby pay. The truck operators would not agree, whereupon the separate longshoremen's union struck the whole port of Albany, to the damage of many employers not connected with the dispute. An injunction was requested in the New York District Court, for this was a clear case of secondary boycott. Before the injunction hearings began a settlement was reached.

This is exactly how the Taft-Hartley Act was intended to operate. But the unions contend that the case is not typical. They claim the law encourages employers to resort to the courts instead of collective bargaining. William A. Moscow of Old Greenwich, Connecticut, recently complained that a union agent threatened to cut off his merchandise if he didn't sign with the union and put two discharged employees back to work. Moscow wanted the gen-





eral council of the NLRB to get the court to enjoin the union. The charge was dismissed because a mere threat to an employer of possible strike action or picketing does not violate the law.

A much more serious criticism is that the act bans all secondary boycotts while the unions maintain that many are legitimate. Suppose, for instance, that workers are engaged in a legitimate strike against their employer. The latter tries to farm out his work to a factory across the road at which members of the same local are employed. The unions maintain that the workers have a perfect right to refuse to handle this work, as a means of helping improve their working conditions or earnings. Senator Taft now accepts the justice of the union claim and thereby admits that the Taft-Hartley Act was unjust in its handling of such matters.

However, Taft would make legal only a very restricted use of the secondary boycott, while the unions justify nearly all secondary economic boycotts. The argument is put in dramatic form by Senator Pepper. He has called attention to the textile mills in his own state of Florida. Union organizers tried to collect signatures of thirty per cent of the employees at a factory as a first step to asking for an election to establish the right to be the certified bargaining agency. The employers used the traditional methods of police suppression and bullying to drive the organizers out of town. The union can only complain of an unfair labor practice. If the complaint is sustained by the trial examiner and he is upheld by the full

NLRB (a process which may easily take two years) all the workers may get in the end is a cease-and-desist order against the employer. If the employers ignore the order, the NLRB can then go into the courts for an enforcement order. And only too frequently a Southern court will side with the employers by modifying or setting aside the NLRB ruling.

Senator Pepper maintains that in this situation workers in plants using the Florida textile mills' products should be free to boycott those products in a fraternal attempt to aid their unorganized fellow workers. As the Taft-

Hartley Act now stands, if such a secondary boycott for economic purposes were launched, the general counsel of the NLRB would be obliged under the law to apply for a court injunction to stop the boycott. And the affected employers could, if they choose, sue the offending union for damages. Since the injunction would be sought quickly the damages actually suffered might not be great, but the power to sue is in the Act.

Experience under the Taft-Hartley Act reveals a division of attitudes between the NLRB itself and its general counsel. The counsel argues that if the dispute concerns a business which in any way "affects commerce," a complaint must be issued and the board must consider it. The board maintains that if the degree to which commerce is affected is only minor, the Federal government should keep hands off and leave the dispute to the parties concerned and to state and local authorities for settlement. For the government to concern itself with minor matters is to use a 150 mm. gun to hunt a mouse.

Broadly, labor-management relations can be handled in three ways: by individual negotiations

between worker and employer; by government regulation; or by collective bargaining between unions and employers of roughly equal power. The first ends up in dictation of employment terms by employers. The second destroys responsibility on both sides and leads to the corporate state. Collective bargaining is the system which best promotes a flexible, responsible economy and gives the best chance of equal justice for employers and workers with reasonable protection for public interest. It is the system endorsed by Congress.

The Taft-Hartley law has attempted—unsuccessfully, so far—to combine the three contradictory systems. It has fostered individual bargaining by discouraging the spread of unions. It has employed government regulation through use of the injunction. And it has declared itself for collective bargaining. Unfortunately, the three conflicting methods have proved to be quite incompatible.

What is needed at this time is a labor law with a single purpose: one which permits the healthy growth of unionism, prohibits government intervention in all but true cases of national emergency, and, above all, fosters the tested principle of collective bargaining.



# The Fourth Round

*Labor has been setting its sights high—perhaps too high; if it refuses to lower them we might have a new strike wave*

This is the season for wage negotiations by union labor and management. As usual, the American public sits by in silence and trepidation. Will we continue to enjoy our increasingly precarious prosperity? Will we maintain a high rate of economic growth and expand our social welfare? Will our national unity grow stronger or weaker in a world insistently challenging us? These are the questions as labor and capital sit down to the conference table.

An active round robin of wage negotiations has been going on and will extend well into July. The main demands of the principal participating unions, though not yet fully revealed, include the following:

**Coal**—a thirty- or thirty-two-hour week, compared to the prevailing forty, with no reduction in workers' pay envelopes; doubling of the present twenty-cent levy on each ton of coal mined for the union welfare fund.

**Steel**—a wage increase expected to be about fifteen cents an hour, an employer-paid monthly retirement-and-disability pension of between \$100 and \$150, and an accident-and-health scheme amounting to about 8.4 cents an hour per employee.

**Auto**—a small wage increase, employer-paid monthly pensions of \$100, and a comprehensive welfare plan amounting to five per cent of payrolls.

**Electrical equipment**—a \$500-a-year increase per worker in wages and welfare benefits taken together, amounting to about twenty-five cents an hour more in wages for each employee.

**Rubber**—a twenty-five-cent hourly wage boost and company-financed monthly pensions of \$100, along with additional health benefits.

Wage increases will also be demanded in other fields—shoes, for example.

Altogether, the total number of union members covered by the June-July negotiations will be some three million. This compares to a total union membership of about 15 million and to a total national labor force of about 62 million. "Labor" in the current negotiations therefore includes only a small part of the working force.

But this arithmetic does not diminish the importance of the present discussions. The character of these wage settlements will influence not only negotiations to be held later this year but those already signed, for many of the latter have reopening clauses. Contracts already signed have included a few slight wage cuts; some, retention of present rates; but in most cases increases amounting to about nine cents an hour per employee.

The unions and the companies argue, but there are no "irreconcilable" issues in the current negotiations. All could go along smoothly if there were some moderate wage boosts, or the equivalent, which would leave both sides privately happy. But there is danger in the present situation, because many powers in management—and labor, as for example, John L. Lewis—are not dead set against strikes; a few weeks' shutdown now that full capacity is behind them, they figure, could be made up later in the year.

The public must ask how granting the union demands would affect the present-day trend of business. The national economic level right now is very high, but the trend seems slowly downward. Prices, especially those of consumer goods, are dropping. Hence labor leaders, robbed of their higher-prices, higher-wages argument, will concentrate on employer-financed welfare plans of one kind or another. The un-

ions certainly deserve credit for bringing the nation's attention to the wretched social-security level prevailing among most of us today. But the most enlightened strategy would seem to be to press for an adequate government social-security program.

The union attitude is, usually, "Let's take our raises out of high profits." But labor cannot demonstrate that profits are large enough to satisfy its appetites. Moreover, its appeal to profits appears insincere, since it will not accept wage cuts in deficit years. "Why take the costs of mismanagement out of our hides?" is labor's argument then.

Union leadership in some cases is also concentrating this year on a shorter work-week. This is a more reasonable demand when it is backed by advances in productivity. The gains of productivity can be enjoyed in either of two ways: by the same amount of work with a greater volume of goods, or the same volume of goods with less work. The second method, which has taken us from sunup-to-sundown working to a forty-hour week, has certainly not yet reached the end of the line. What labor is after is an American-style welfare state. Such a state would give more goods and services to non-producing persons—the old, the handicapped, children, etc. But this obviously requires a steadily increasing supply of goods. Welfare is something to be worked hard for.

The United States remains unfinished. There still is too much poverty. Labor, of all groups in our society, should have the keenest interest in keeping America's rate of economic growth high. The average non-farm worker nearly doubled his real earnings in the last sixty years. There is no reason why he should not do just as well in the future.



# Labor's Foreign Service

*American unionists assume a bold and direct role in our foreign relations and in European recovery*



A year ago, a truck driver hauling fish, tulip bulbs, or American tractor parts from Rotterdam to Paris wasted a total of fourteen hours on the road while his personal and cargo papers were laboriously checked at the Belgian, Luxembourg, and French frontiers. He arrived, exhausted and feeling like a fugitive, to face complaints that his deliveries were late. Moreover he had to calculate a cut in his own wages: when a truck driver is paid by the trip, border delays are on his own time.

Today his goods are sealed before he leaves Holland; he briefly shows an identity card bearing his photograph and fingerprints at customs stations, and rolls on to his destination on schedule. His earnings are up, he feels respectable, and international commerce is a good bit smoother.

Recently a steel man in Sheffield, England, needed a specially skilled hand for his mill. The local labor office could produce nobody, but officials located—by phoning Brussels—a qualified workman. In less than a week the Belgian was in Sheffield on the job. Not long ago, passport or other restrictions might have made it impossible for a Briton to hire a foreigner at all.

These examples of corner-cutting to speed European recovery reflect the closest labor-management-government collaboration ever seen in peacetime Europe. They reflect something else: the direct participation of American organized labor in the Marshall Plan. U. S. union men have been on hand in international conferences, contributing their own techniques to reduce customs restrictions and get goods rolling,

to establish manpower pools, to liberalize immigration requirements, and to modernize equipment and methods.

Labor has penetrated the ECA particularly deeply. Clinton S. Golden and Bert Jewell, Paul Hoffman's chief labor advisers in Washington, have sent out special Labor Divisions to operate in most of the ECA missions abroad. The men are drawn directly from AFL, CIO, or independent unions. While they are on their assignments they do not officially represent their unions but are full-fledged emissaries of our government, often at a level on which they can help make policy.

The idea of encouraging union men to help fashion foreign policy would have horrified earlier generations of diplomats. The reason this generation has had to turn to labor is that social-democratic elements are so powerful in many European countries, especially Britain and the Scandinavian nations. The officials of these governments—many of whom were deep in trade-union work themselves not long ago—can deal more easily with American unionists than with the usual run of suave, detached emissaries. As a matter of fact, the effectiveness of U. S. labor experts abroad has been strongest in countries where social-democrats are in control.

When A. E. Staley, Jr., a syrup and salad-oil manufacturer from the Midwest, resigned as head of the ECA mission to Norway in May, he was succeeded by a trade unionist, John E. Gross, a fifty-six-year-old AFL machinist from Pueblo, Colorado. A month later, Michael Harris, a CIO Steelworkers official, was promoted from the post of labor adviser in France to direct the ECA in Sweden. Gross and Harris are the first labor men to fill such posts.

Each has the diplomatic rank of minister and must on occasion wear striped pants, an item which neither had in his wardrobe before. With the colorful abuse reserved for "traitors to the masses," the Communist press has condemned them both.

Actually, *Friheten*, the Communist daily in Oslo, has been peppering Gross since November when he first went to Norway as Staley's labor adviser. It has denounced him as passionately as if he presaged another Fascist invasion, dubbed him "Gauleiter Gross," and implied darkly that his assignment was to seize control of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions.

This violent reaction betrays the importance Soviet circles attach to the appointment of a labor man. The Communists are making it hard for us to disabuse the European working classes of the notion that the ECA's real purpose is to reduce their homes, such as they are, to rubble in the prosecution of a third world war, or at least reduce their countries to "American colonies."

Such fears may sound fantastic but





the fact is that few Midwesterners were ever more isolationist emotionally than the average citizen of Europe is today. He is anti-foreign and wants to be let alone. His common sense tells him that he needs help to recover from the deep wounds of war, and that it is logical to look to big, powerful America for such assistance. But he is more suspicious of American aid than he is grateful for it; he resents the fact that he needs it, and he is afraid that it might involve him in a colossal clash between West and East.

Gradually, ECA labor men are beginning to get the worker's ear by working through small but resolute non-Communist unions. They constantly run up against suspicion and doubt. Men like Louis Bobin, French Catholic trade-union leader, and Raymond Lebourse, member of the board of the *Force Ouvrière*, ask a stronger voice for unions in the ECA. In a recent radio round-table discussion, Bobin said: "We have proof that big trusts have profited by a large part of the American effort, but we have no tangible proof that the standard of living of French workers has risen in the same proportion."

The labor emissaries are expected to find and furnish the worker's point of view on the impact of the ECA, whether it comes from a Cleveland millhand or a riveter on the Clyde. Not long ago, when an ECA project to survey hydro-electric power possibilities in Greece was awarded to Electric Bond & Share, with possible options on future operating contracts, labor protested. Union officials in Washington recalled the company's violent opposition to the TVA and said it would be dangerous to allow it to operate in Europe where public ownership of utilities is almost universal. An affiliate of Electric Bond

& Share is making the survey, but so far has no privileges to participate in operations.

One ECA goal is increased production per man-hour. European workers have generally mistaken this to mean "speed-up" instead of labor-saving improvements. ECA labor men, by visiting European plants themselves and by encouraging European labor delegations to visit the U.S., are helping to dispel this misunderstanding. A party of Norwegian trade unionists who spent a month in the States last winter was astonished by American efficiency and workers' living standards. One remarked that if Norway's fledgling aluminum industry could borrow some U.S. workers as instructors, it could quadruple production.

Norway has a labor shortage of roughly fifty-five thousand men, but the huge fishing industry is unmodernized and overmanned. Some ECA officials were impatient to press the seemingly logical solution of overhauling the fishing fleets and putting surplus personnel to work elsewhere, but the Norwegians weren't readily responsive. It took Gross, the union man, to win their confidence and find out why. "The fishermen were once the most exploited class in Norway," an official told him. "After a long struggle and some disastrous strikes they succeeded in fathering our cooperative movement. Now they occupy a special place among us. The industry needs reorganizing but we must go slowly."

Psychology counts. Learning that Special ECA Ambassador W. Averell Harriman was in Athens on a flying trip, a group of Greek unionists asked to see him. His schedule was full but the mission labor expert, Alan Strachan (ex-United Auto Workers organizer), and Harry Martin, president of the American Newspaper Guild, who was traveling with Harriman as special adviser, arranged for him to receive the delegation. Impressed, the men blew off steam to him for an hour. "He was easier to see than some of our own officials," one remarked later.

There has been opposition to ECA Labor Division activities in the United States, not only from business elements but from the State Department and professional diplomats who regard U.S. foreign relations as their private preserve. One criticism is that no matter how good a trade unionist a man may

be, the chances are that he has never learned the nuances of diplomacy and politics in the international league.


One labor diplomat answers that argument this way: "Many of our Ambassadors still aren't trained for the job. In Oslo the ECA mission is becoming more important than the embassy. Ambassador Charles Ulrick Bay [a multimillionaire] is a charming gentleman, but the Norwegians feel closer to John Gross."

Neither Irving Brown nor Elmer Cope, the special representatives of the AFL and CIO in Europe, feels that labor is yet sufficiently represented in the Marshall Plan, but they agree that unions must be ready to sacrifice—temporarily, at least—some of their best men to government service if they want their influence increased. "Unions can't give up cast-off business agents for assignment overseas and say they have contributed," Brown has warned.

One European union member has summed up the situation as follows:

"There are great numbers of European workers who don't think Communism is the answer for them. But they are still distrustful of American aims and they face the opposition of powerful Communist unions. They are weak, tired, disorganized, and bereft of aggressive leadership. The inspiration and the leadership can come from the American rank-and-file. There never was a greater opportunity for the American working man to make his influence felt in international dimensions than now."

—EDWARD P. MORGAN



# To Man's Measure...



## The Wrestlers

In Switzerland, every year, at Sion in the Valais, a sporting event called the Combat of the Cows takes place. It is organized, large crowds of people interested in cows come to watch it, and the cows themselves take so great an interest in it that they would organize it of their own accord even if this field were not provided, with the flags flying all round it, and the audience there to admire and applaud their prowess. For foreigners, the Combat of the Cows requires a little technical explanation.

Swiss cows are very strong cows. They have to be, because in the summer they climb halfway up the Alps to their summer pastures. They follow a leader, the cow in which they place their confidence, the strongest cow of the herd. All the cows wear bells hung from leather collars round their necks, but the leader wears a heavier bell that sounds a grave, deep tone like the special bells in the steeples of the land that ring only for solemn religious or national events. The Combat of the Cows is a tournament to determine the right to the leader's bell.

Head against head, two cows at a time match their strength, their short horns locked, weight and muscle versus weight and muscle, until one of them is driven back a step, and then another step, and then turns away defeated.

In New York, in the saloon, the man looked away from the wrestlers on the television screen. "They're fat cows," he said, "they're fat as pigs, they're fat as cows; they're great fat clowns."

The bartender said, "It's insincere.

In the fights it's that way too sometimes, but in this wrestling it's always insincere. I see them; I don't mean now," he said, "I see them in the mornings. Some of them live in the hotel there across the street and I see them in the mornings gabbing there on the sidewalk in front of the hotel, taking the air and they are as friendly as can be. No matter what they do to each other in the ring at night they're always there in the morning as friendly as can be."

On the screen one man was down. The other, on his feet, pulled the man's arm, kicked him in the armpit, twisted the arm. The man in the white pants got up. The man in the black pants slapped him in the face, kicked him in the stomach, fell on top of him, and began twisting the arm again. Then he got up and jumped up and down on his stomach.

"The bad boy always loses," the bartender said, "that's the way the fans like it. It's insincere, always has been since I was a kid."

"Nobody gets hurt," the man at the bar said, "it's all for laughs." Then he looked at the screen again. He did not laugh.

When in Sion you watch the cows, the fight is a clean fight, cow against cow and no cheating. You are not ashamed, you do not feel dirty. It is a fine thing also to see man against man in any test of strength or courage. But something has gone wrong when a spectacle is made of the human body degraded by pain, outraged in contortion. Something in man's dignity is defiled when men in saloons feel the need to reassure one another, like children waking frightened at night, and say





over and over again to each other that the horror in the night is not real.

## Weekend

On holiday nights automobiles crowd the parkways returning to the city; you have to be very careful about your driving. It is not so very much fun because all the fun has been at the beach or in the country, and no matter how wonderful the day has been it is now just a matter of getting home, and of course the next day you have to go to work. So that most drivers are tired and sometimes nervous, and there are always reports of accidents in the papers next day. This story is not about an accident.

One holiday night last month, a man named Herman Newton, aged twenty-two, his wife, Lottie, and his sister, Dorothy, residents of Brooklyn, New York, were coming home. Newton was driving. He ran no one down; he did not hit another car; he did not drive off the road, or over the bridge into the river. What happened to him—up to a point—has happened to most of us. He got into a quarrel with the driver of another car and both cars stopped so that the quarrel could be pursued. The driver of the other car was Donald Mullen, aged twenty-nine.

Usually this sort of scene would end with Newton and Mullen driving away, both still angry, convinced of being in the right, aware also that it was a pity the holiday should end in a row. You can picture it any way you want. Mullen was alone in his car, so that if he had

driven off he would have been talking to himself. Newton would have been telling his wife and sister that he should never have let that guy get away with it; or again, Lottie and Dorothy would have been telling him that he should have kept his trap shut in the first place; or all three of them would have been silently wondering why there had to be so much trouble in the world. You can figure it out anyway you like, but you will never know because Mullen and Newton did not drive away. Mullen shot Newton twice and killed him. Donald Mullen is a Brooklyn policeman—at the time of the incident off duty and in plain clothes. Herman Newton was a Negro.

## A Room of My Own

The United Nations is a vast housing project. "What kind of a house do we make for the Germans, where do we put the D.P.'s? There are the Italians and they keep having too many children; they tried moving in on the Ethiopians and it did not work out so well. There are the Indonesians who claim that they, and not the Dutch, are the rightful landlords of certain islands. Where do we put the Arabs evicted by the Jews? And even if there were not the Japanese too crowded also on their islands, even if you do not think in terms of races, nationalities and peoples, there still would be this young man somewhere, anywhere, who wants to go somewhere, anywhere else, and cannot do so because the frontier guards won't let him pass.

We have this entire world of many mansions, but always there are too many or too few people in each house.

"The map we have of the world with all the countries painted in different colors is a fine architect's drawing for the residence of mankind—only it is out of date. It was made for clients who first were squatters and later, as fast as they could, went in for restricted areas and armed guards at the gates. If we do not want to have a lot of people murdering each other in order to get rooms of their own, what modernized housing do we put up for the world population of say, the year 2000? Meanwhile where do we put Dr. Ralph J. Bunche?"

The delicate and difficult task of finding a house in which this American, who put an end to a war, can live—in his own country, in the North of his own country—without offending his neighbors' sensitiveness or too seriously depreciating the value of their real estate, has provisionally been solved. Dr. Bunche, whose title, "The Mediator," reminds one of the statesmen of classical antiquity, is now permitted to live in Parkway Village, Long Island, a UN housing settlement.

President Truman had invited him to live in Washington—as an Assistant Secretary of State. Dr. Bunche had, of course, reasons for not wanting to return to live again in the capital of the United States; it is not a pleasant place for Negroes. But, as he said at Fisk University, "We Negroes must be great realists . . . While nothing is easy for the Negro in America, neither is anything impossible." It was not because he lacked the courage to face segregation that he refused the appointment. Perhaps he was not thinking of himself at all but rather of the high position and the dignity that an Assistant Secretary of State occupies in our government. Perhaps he was thinking that a high American official could not sneak into hotels through the back door to call on high foreign officials, or be thrown out of restaurants, or hurry home to the ghetto after work, without making America look ridiculous. Perhaps Dr. Bunche refused to expose the government of his country to public humiliation. The *Washington Post* remarked, "Only in his department would he have been honored.

"Outside its doors he would have had the status of a coolie."



# Young Man's Burden

*At thirty-three, Harold Wilson holds one of Britain's most responsible and demanding governmental posts*



Two young men sat in a dressing-room of the Palladium Theatre in London one evening last spring. One was an American comedian named Danny Kaye. The other was the youngest high-ranking member of the British Cabinet since William Pitt a century and a half ago—Harold Wilson, the thirty-three-year-old President of the Board of Trade.

Kaye had arrived in London six weeks before for a month's booking; in response to heavy demand, he had stayed on for an extra fortnight. The British wanted still more of him. So the Cabinet minister asked the comedian whether he would return soon.

Jokingly, Kaye said that, in view of Britain's dollar shortage, he might be willing to come back for nothing except his expenses.

"Where do you stay?" Wilson asked.

"At the Savoy."

Wilson smiled wanly. "The British Government can't afford it," he said.

Harold Wilson has to say this sort of thing with depressing frequency. He has had to say it to British smokers pleading for more tobacco; to film salesmen from Hollywood; to businessmen offering their wares to goods-starved British customers; to his own countrymen hankering for a respite from rationing.

Today Wilson is a key figure in the Labour Government's survival program. He works under Sir Stafford

Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir Stafford calls the signals for Britain's economic team; Wilson makes the line plunges.

His responsibilities are so vast and so complex that the United States has never conferred their equivalents on any one man. If it did, the official would have to be Secretary of Commerce, head of postwar OPA (except for food, which is handled by the Food Ministry), Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Patent Commissioner, Alien Property Custodian, head of a postwar Foreign Economic Administration, and chairman of both the Tariff and Federal Trade Commissions.

Actually, Wilson's responsibility is even greater than all this would indicate. In every decision, in every act, he must help remake the whole economic life of forty-nine million British subjects, who face the dismal prospect of increasing production and exporting heavily while they get used to a lowered standard of living.

Wilson, who has been called by Eric Johnston "one of the toughest but fairest bargainers I have ever dealt with," learned to bargain at the hardest school of all—Moscow. He earned his reputation, in fact, by demonstrating that he was one western democrat who could conduct trade negotiations with the Russians without being skinned alive.

In April, 1947, before he was assigned his present office, he went to Moscow to talk trade with A. J. Mikoyan, then Soviet Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Trade. He was offering British machinery for Russian grain and timber. That looked good to both countries, but Mikoyan had other deals to propose. Britain had advanced Russia large credits in 1941 to permit the embattled Soviets to buy goods

abroad, and Russia had promised at the time to repay in dollars or another hard currency. Now Mikoyan was proposing to Wilson that, before going ahead with their trade talks, Britain should agree, first, to extend the period of repayment on that old debt; second, to reduce the interest rate from two per cent to one-half of one per cent; and third, to accept a less desirable currency. Wilson agreed to the first two proposals but not to the third.

For five weeks the two men went ahead with the details of the trade agreement, discussing quantities, prices, terms. Contracts were drawn up, and some were even signed. The Russians would send Britain large amounts of cereals, timber, canned fish; a Soviet purchasing mission would visit London to buy British products.

At this point Mikoyan apparently decided that he had whetted the appetite of the British enough so that they would make the concessions he had demanded unsuccessfully at the start. But Wilson, already experienced in saying no, said it again. Thereupon the discussions broke down, and Wilson left for home with empty hands.

In December he made a second try, this time as President of the Board of Trade. He flew to Moscow and plunged into a series of interminable discussions with Mikoyan. Officials who accompanied him marveled at his never-failing freshness. "As soon as the door opened," one of them recalls, "it was like showing the ideal pond to a very vigorous duck." Wilson and Mikoyan sparred continually. Several times Wilson packed his bags and ordered his plane for departure; each time, at the last minute, Mikoyan asked him to stay a little longer.

The last session began at 7 o'clock in the evening and lasted until 6 the next

morning. Wilson and Mikoyan were still fresh, but their aides were stretched out on chairs and sofas, when the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was finally initialled.

Wilson had won. He had made some concessions on the credit question—but he had not given in on the crucial matter of dollars.

Harold Wilson's appearance is as commonplace as Churchill's is arresting. He is of medium height, and not quite portly in build (though he looks as though he will be in a few years). His face is round and quite unlined. He wears a full but somehow unobtrusive mustache, and, like most Englishmen, he generally needs a haircut. His suits are dark and unostentatious.

The first impression is of a complacent, hard-to-ruffle man; but a longer look at Wilson, particularly when he is talking, hints that the serenity of his features is the product of determined facial control. He is unmistakably a cool customer. His voice is pleasant and businesslike, but it is not a social instrument. He is a rather ingratiating composite of shyness and aggressiveness.

Wilson neither looks nor sounds like anybody's conception of a Socialist. He seems at home in his cold, cheerless office on the top floor of the Imperial Chemical Industries Building, as though his natural habitat is a room, like this one, with a desk, a telephone, a stenographer, a file clerk, and a battery of experts down the hall. Now that he gets five thousand pounds a year as a Cabinet minister, he has a home in

Golders Green, an expensive but not exclusive residential suburb of London. The Wilsons (his wife is the daughter of a Cambridge clergyman) have a four-year-old son named Robin.


James Harold Wilson was born in 1916 in Yorkshire, and he still uses the broad vowels and thickened words of his native province. His father, an industrial chemist at a local factory, was a strong Liberal who later joined the Labour Party. The family was respectably lower middle class, with no money to send the boy to a school like Eton or Harrow. He went, instead, to municipal schools, and when he was eleven, won a scholarship to Royd's Hall, in West Riding.

At eighteen, Wilson got another scholarship—this time to Oxford. In three years there he received the Gladstone Prize, the Webb Medley scholarship, and first-class honors in philosophy, politics, and economics. At twenty-one, he became a lecturer in economics at New College; a year later, he was a fellow of University College at Oxford.

Unquestionably brilliant, he was snapped up by Sir William Beveridge, the great English economist and public servant who was soon to achieve world fame as the author of the womb-to-tomb security plan. Beveridge worked Wilson eighteen hours each day.

At the outbreak of war, Wilson entered the War Cabinet secretariat as an economic assistant. In a few months he was assigned to the Ministry of Labour, where he worked until 1943, when Britain's coal crisis had become a major war problem. Wilson was thrust into the middle of it. He was appointed Director of Economics and Statistics at the Ministry of Fuel and Power; as such he became joint secretary of the Anglo-American Coal Committee and secretary of a special board inquiring into miners' wages.

The latter post he found particularly trying, because of the tension between miners and coal operators and the Coalition Government's inability to do anything decisive about it. The Conservatives under Churchill would not, of course, sanction any measure that looked at all like nationalization of the mines; and Wilson's Socialist principles were offended again and again by the compromises his own party was forced to make while the war lasted. When



the war ended, he resigned from the Civil Service and announced himself a Labour candidate for Parliament in the Ormskirk constituency, an industrial district near Liverpool.

At about the same time, he published an earnest little book called *A New Deal for Coal*, which—together with a statistical report he had previously produced for the government—became one of the chief guides for the Labour Government's ultimate nationalization of the coal industry.

With the Labour Party victory in 1945, Wilson took his seat in Commons. His first appointment was as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Works, and soon he was being mentioned as a Cabinet possibility. He was twenty-nine then. William Pitt had been Chancellor at twenty-three and Prime Minister at twenty-four, but Churchill had not reached the Cabinet until he was thirty-four, Anthony Eden not until he was thirty-eight.

By March, 1947, Wilson was in the Cabinet, in the relatively minor post of Secretary for Overseas Trade. It was in this capacity that he conducted his first set of trade negotiations with the Russians. The Labour Party's *Daily Herald* announced that he was "moving rapidly toward the statesman class." The ultra-Conservative *Daily Telegraph*, describing him as "able and ambitious," reported that he was "tipped for high office."

The tip was soon to come. While





Wilson was on vacation in 1947, Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, incautiously gave a newspaperman the highlights of his 1948 budget a few minutes before announcing them in the House of Commons. For this indiscretion, Dalton was fired from his position, and Sir Stafford Cripps took his place. This left the Presidency of the Board of Trade vacant, and Attlee and Cripps chose Harold Wilson.

Since the beginning of the Second World War, the Board of Trade has been the heart of Britain's economic life. It handles commercial relations and treaties with other countries, including a good part of the Marshall Plan negotiations. It fixes tariffs and purchases raw materials abroad. Its activities in industry and manufacture range from granting import licenses to working up efficient new factory methods. It sets prices and can ration consumer goods except food. It has a good deal to say about the textile industries (silk, wool, cotton), as well as the pottery, furniture, and other consumer-goods industries. Through commercial attachés at British Embassies abroad, it promotes British exports. It administers Britain's company laws affecting bankruptcy. It controls the location of new industries and the diversion of factories to "development areas" outside the present overcrowded industrial districts. It supervises the film industry. It lays down policy on trade with occupied Germany and handles enemy property. It runs salvage campaigns.

Wilson's basic job is that of curing Britain's economic illness—a job so engulfing that neither its beginning nor its end can be clearly sighted. It is not, essentially, a Socialist program that Wilson is carrying out. Now that most of the nationalizing has halted, probably until after the 1950 elections (if the Labour Party wins), the program is more like Roosevelt's New Deal than Fabian Socialism.

In simple terms, the British are attempting to buy as little and sell as much as possible abroad. When imports are absolutely necessary, they buy as much as they can from countries that will accept pounds; they sell as much as they can to countries that will pay in dollars. Meantime, Britain is taking strong measures against inflation at home—price controls, heavy taxation, pressure on nonessential industries, and some rationing. This



master plan is not Wilson's. It was drawn up by Sir Stafford Cripps. Wilson is Cripps's chief lieutenant.

Wilson is not a fanatic Socialist, but does think that Socialism is the way to achieve a better life for more people. Capitalism, he believes, failed to accomplish that in Britain. In *A New Deal for Coal*, he called for nationalization of the mines, but he added that it would not "solve the problem of industrial relations, but is an essential condition of a solution." "Nationalization," he went on, "will do no more than create conditions in which the skill and experience of mining engineers and miners will have full scope." After that, they would be on their own. Today, he has a sick textile industry on his hands, but he hasn't talked of nationalizing it. His plans do not greatly differ from what might, under similar circumstances, be proposed in America.

Wilson is very sure of himself, and of

the British people. I asked him once whether a crisis psychology might not be useful in Britain now. "Our people don't like the word 'crisis' and don't understand the word 'psychology,'" he replied tartly. "We didn't have a crisis psychology in 1940, either, when ninety per cent of the people in your country thought we couldn't pull through."

I asked whether he considered his youth a handicap in a country so wedded to tradition and so elderly in its mannerisms. "If you had been in this job for six months," he retorted, "you wouldn't know what youth was! But, as a matter of fact, it's a real physical advantage here. A young man can go night after night with little sleep, and still retain some of his freshness."

Here is a typical Wilson week-end: At 9:45 AM one Friday he signed a film agreement, then held a press conference to explain its contents. At 11 he went to the House of Commons to take part in the debate on the Cotton

Industry Bill. Shortly after noon he drove to Croydon, where he took a plane to Leeds, arriving there about 2:30. He went to Heckmondwike to hand out prizes at a school, having written his speech in the plane. Then he drove to Liverpool, arriving between 6 and 7. At 8 he addressed a meeting near Liverpool, having written his speech in the car.

The next morning, Saturday, he was up at 6 to write the speech which he delivered at a morning meeting of cotton-industry officials in Manchester. He shared the platform there with the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Education. At 1 he held a press conference, where he repeated his speech verbatim from memory. He then lunched with the Cotton Board, and at 4 drove back to Liverpool. At 8 he addressed another meeting of constituents, and then caught the midnight train back to London. Arriving at 6 Sunday morning, he was met by a car with four red dispatch boxes filled with official papers. He spent all day Sunday at home, going over them.

Wilson is rather smug in speaking about his youth. "When I dealt with the Russians," he says, "my age was a great advantage. They didn't expect any guile from a young man like myself, as they might have done from a seasoned diplomat." He pauses, then adds hastily: "Not that they were deceived. I don't have any guile. I'm a Yorkshireman."

It should be explained that Yorkshiremen like to think of themselves as good, bluff, hearty, honest, straightforward, shrewd folk. Britons who do not come from Yorkshire might agree that Yorkshiremen are shrewd.

Whether shrewd or guileless, this young man is furnishing the British people leadership in their present plight. He has not achieved much personal popularity, but his name is known to every Briton. And a young Labour politician, talking about him, told me:

"You don't realize what a handicap Wilson has. Here he is, in his early thirties, and President of the Board of Trade. If he's to move up, there are only three bigger jobs in this country—Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary, and Prime Minister. For a young man looking for advancement, that's a hell of a bleak prospect."

—DAVID BERNSTEIN

## Bishop in the Stockyards

*Sheil of Chicago runs a cartel—of charitable, social-service, educational, pro-labor enterprises*

One evening in the summer of 1939, the Most Reverend Bernard J. Sheil, D.D., Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, stood beside John L. Lewis on the platform at a huge *cio* rally in the Chicago Coliseum. The rally had been summoned to support the *cio*'s organizing drive in the packing industry. The rough, tough Big Four meat packers were bitterly resisting, as they had resisted all previous efforts to unionize "the jungle" of Packingtown. But something was different this time.

A sociologist from the University of Chicago had moved into Packingtown to organize the Back of the Yards Council, a strange new instrument of democracy which lined up neighborhood merchants, clergymen, politicians, and real-estate owners on the side of the workers. A leading spirit in the council was "Benny" Sheil, a west-side Chicago Irish boy, by then become a bishop and Cardinal Mundelein's good right arm.

The Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago stood on the platform beside John L. Lewis and invoked the benediction of God on the *cio* rally. Some of Chicago's most powerful businessmen, as

well as the packers, had warned him not to appear. Gunmen had sprayed bullets through the windows of a restaurant where he usually ate lunch. A union organizer had been shot leaving a neighborhood meeting at which the bishop appeared. But he joined the throngs at the Coliseum to explain what he took to be his "duty as a priest of God and a guardian of our youth." The packing-house workers went out to win their strike knowing that the bishop was on their side. Ever since then, organized labor generally has known that Bishop Sheil was on its side when its argument was valid.

At sixty-one, the bishop looks exactly like a bishop: short, stubby, round-faced, nearly bald, with flashing eyes and a broad, engaging smile. As a boy he had peddled papers in the street and become one of the best young athletes on the west side, but there never seemed to be any doubt that Benny Sheil would go into the priesthood. His devout parents sent him to parochial school, then to St. Viator College at Bourbonnais, Illinois. The college is defunct now, but its alumni still remember how Benny Sheil pitched its baseball team to a no-hit victory over the University of Illinois the year Illinois won the Big Ten championship.

In the First World War, he was a Navy chaplain at Great Lakes, where he distinguished himself by indefatigable service during a devastating flu epidemic. Back in Chicago after the armistice, he became chaplain at the Cook County Jail. He walked with murderers to the electric chair, consoled pimps and pickpockets, and listened to the confessions of scared kids gone wrong. It was there that he conceived his great idea: A Catholic Youth Organization, a sort of lay branch of





the church, designed as a bulwark against the social influences that put dead-end kids on the road to crime.

Cardinal Mundelein, whose name is still exalted in Chicago, took note of the young priest and lifted him rapidly through the stages of ecclesiastical preferment. By 1928, at forty, he was a bishop. That gave him the power, and his zeal (together with an uncommon talent for extracting cash from wealthy laymen) gave him the means, to build the cvo into a social-service organization serving a hundred thousand young people a year. Cvo boxing teams began winning most of the Golden Gloves bouts. Cvo case workers went into the slums to catch and correct delinquents before they became delinquent. Cvo camps, classes, scout troops, community centers, basketball tournaments, and dances became a fixed part of neighborhood life in the Catholic districts of Chicago. You didn't have to be a Catholic, and you didn't have to be white, to take part in cvo activities.

Inevitably, the bishop's interest in youth broadened to embrace the economic welfare of their parents. In the 1930's, a perceptive social-service worker could not deal with the end products of social maladjustment without tracing its sources back to the desperation and poverty of the unemployed. Bishop Sheil had the courage to follow the thread all the way. That is how he came to align himself with the working stiff of the slaughterhouses in their struggle for higher pay and decent working conditions.

Ten years after he shocked the town by blessing a militant cvo, Bishop Sheil still occupies the same place in the hierarchy. If anything, he may have slipped a little, for under Mundelein he was the cardinal's acknowledged deputy. With the death of Cardinal Mundelein and the accession of Archbishop Samuel A. Stritch, his position

in the church appeared to freeze. Yet during the same ten years, his influence in Chicago has steadily expanded.

What may be called "Sheil Enterprises"—the cartel of sociological, charitable, and educational projects which he directs—has grown until it now spends well over a million dollars and operates an FM radio station. The bishop's liberal convictions have deepened with time. In addition to fighting the Taft-Hartley Act, he has become a leading spokesman against racial segregation in all its forms.

Many of Bishop Sheil's friends believe that his unusual status buttresses the unparalleled freedom of his thought and speech, a freedom which nobody in the church, so far as is known, has undertaken to curtail. He appears to regard as his constituency the whole mass of ordinary people who work for a living. "Too much respect for the local banker, industrialist, or politician," he said in one of his speeches, "has caused [churchmen] to be silent when the teachings of Christ should have been literally shouted from the housetops." He is fond of quoting the Popes on the church's loss of contact with the masses during the nineteenth century. That might not have happened, he says, if the clergy had stood out "like beacons of social justice on the mountaintop." He has publicly scolded Catholic clergymen for tolerating racial segregation in church-sponsored hospitals and schools, to say nothing of the churches themselves. Conscious of the criticism that has been directed against him for "imprudence," he also has advised his brethren not to confuse prudence with basic compromise. "The mission of the church," he said, "is to witness to truth and justice, and to hold constantly before the world the flaming torch of the integral, pure, austere, undiluted

Christian message." At one of his meetings, when he was preaching the "pure, austere, undiluted Christian message," a hate-filled woman stepped in his path and spat in his face. Calmly wiping himself with a handkerchief, he said: "Thank you. The man I am following took that many times."

It was inevitable that he should be labeled a "Red Bishop." He has never made any secret of his revulsion to Communism, but at the same time he is temperamentally unable to fix his attention on remote evils while neglecting those before his eyes. This has led him to the conclusion that the only test of an economic system is how well it fulfills its purpose. Profit, power, all other considerations to him are secondary. American business, he often says, "has not learned a very simple thing—that the dollar is not an almighty god, but that human beings are very precious." If business cannot employ workers, then government, he argues, "is bound by its very nature to employ all its resources to secure all citizens this essential right to work." He denounces propaganda which seeks to sell the idea that democracy is synonymous with capitalism. "To make democracy subservient to an economic system which measures life solely in terms of material values," he has said, "is to pervert it completely."

In 1946, when the postwar witch hunt was shifting into high gear, Bishop Sheil addressed the first convention of the American Veterans Committee. He tried to explain his attitude toward Communism. "Many men raise the Red scare of Communism whenever plans for social improvement are proposed," he said. "But America has nothing to fear from Communism if we have here a social order that regards man as 'at the same time the beginning and the end of life in human society.' People who are well-fed, well-clothed, and well-housed are not interested in Communism."

Answering Upton Close, a commentator who accused him of being a Communist, Sheil said, "As a bishop of the Roman Catholic church I have constantly tried to hasten the coming of that social reconstruction of the world for which the Popes have labored so hard and so long. . . . I have taken my stand uncompromisingly on the side of the poor, the disinherited, and the dispossessed. I shall continue to do



so. . . When I plead for economic and social betterment, it is because it will make it a little easier for men in their struggle to save their immortal souls. For, as Cardinal Saliège has said: "The Kingdom of God is not of this world, but it is in this world that it is won."

The bishop leads an active and tireless life. His day begins with mass at St. Andrew's Cathedral on the west side. He lives in the rectory there. By 10:30 he is at his office in the cvo building, an unadorned, smoky structure hard by the clattering Elevated, a block off Michigan Avenue.

For most of the day, he is the equivalent of a business executive as he directs the manifold affairs of the cvo and related organizations. The cvo spends half a million dollars a year, less than one-third of which comes from the Community Fund, the balance from contributions, boxing shows, benefit balls, and similar stunts. It is a strangely mixed enterprise. Across the hall from the gym, with its stringy adolescents dancing about the boxing rings, are the offices of case workers, the classrooms of the Sheil School of Social Studies, a secluded chapel, publicity offices, a theater workshop. After lunch, Bishop Sheil may duck out to go to attend a confirmation, or perform some other ecclesiastical duty. These days he spends as much of the afternoon as possible on his newest enterprise—Radio Station WFJL, which began broadcasting in May. He himself is on the air each week with an interpretive discussion of *Our Present Crisis*. One of his first broadcasts was in support of a state FEPC for Illinois.

Labor finds Bishop Sheil a dependable ally; he does not fade away in the pinch. In 1947, when many fair-weather friends of the unions found it convenient to still their tongues, the bishop raised his voice against the Taft-Hartley Act, and publicly called upon President Truman to veto it. The claim then being made that unions had grown too strong he described as "a bitter joke."

Yet it can safely be said that the bishop is not blind to the shortcomings of labor. On several occasions he has advised the unions to get rid of their racketeers and Communist leaders, both of whom are, he believes, "a scandal to the entire labor movement."

But he has never considered either racketeers or Communists as the principal items of interest on the labor landscape. At the Catholic Conference on Industrial Problems three years ago he said: "All labor, through labor unions, must participate in the *management* of industry." He frequently cites Pope Pius XI's proposal for industry councils, in which government, labor, and management would share a partnership of economic control, as a method of resolving the problem of individual liberty within a collective organization of society.


Since the war, his interests have broadened to cover other causes. At a time when Cardinal Stritch was declaring that world government is "not in God's plan," Bishop Sheil was speaking for the yielding of sovereignty "in certain international affairs" for the purpose of building a world society. He has served as co-chairman of the Chicago Council Against Racial Discrimination. Characteristically, he refuses to weasel on the tough central issue of racial democracy, segregation.

"To list the evils which grow out of restrictive covenants," he has said, "is to enumerate the sins against charity of which we, the white population, have been guilty. Poor health, improper housing, disease, crime . . . are the products of racial segregation."

Shortly after the end of the war, President Truman sent the bishop to Germany as his personal representative to survey youth conditions there. Two years ago the Governor of Illinois appointed him to a Youthful Offenders Commission to investigate the state's system of juvenile correction.

In all his tasks Bishop Sheil carries with him a personal philosophy of revolution. "In the early springtime of its dynamic and contagious enthusiasm," he says, "Christianity was the most radical and uncompromising revolution that men had ever experienced. One of the truly tragic happenings of the modern age is that this same Christianity, because of fear and too much human respect, has been allowed to become synonymous with conservatism."

—ROBERT LASCH



# Show Window of the East

*Czechoslovakia—a going industrial concern—is far and away the most profitable investment the Communists have yet made*



—Czechoslovakia is the one country that had little, if any, need of them in the first place. It isn't easy for the Communists to persuade the Czechs that they have been given something they lacked.

In some other countries on the east side of the iron curtain the sugar coating of reform around the pill of the police state is thick, and sweet to the taste. Here the pill is almost all pill. Even social security is nothing new. The best the Communists can claim is that the social-security system the Czechs had before the coup would have been done away with by a "reactionary counter-revolution."

Yet, in spite of the meagerness of Communist accomplishments, it would be absurd to talk about Czech resistance. There has been some grumbling, and that is about all. Nor is the reason hard to find.

More than three hundred years ago the Czechs felt a great urge to lead their own lives according to their own lights. Stirred by the doctrines of John Huss, they decided to be governed not by the Austrians but by themselves. They sought and obtained allies, and promises of military assistance. They prepared for battle. Then their allies let them down. At the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 the Hussites were wiped out, and when the Thirty Years' War finally ended in the Peace

of Westphalia in 1648, the Czechs were quite forgotten.

In 1938 the Czechs were firm in their resolve to defend the country and, above all, to resist tyranny. They had allies, and promises of military assistance. They prepared for battle. And again their allies let them down. This time it was not feasible to fight alone. They submitted, fingers crossed, to the Germans. That is how they have reacted now to the Communists.

A western European—or even an American—is in a poor position to criticize the Czechs. If there had been no Munich they might not have knuckled under last year. Before Munich, the Czechs were ready to resist to the last man the will of the invader. But then there *was* Munich, and not much could be done. Nor can much today.

The worst of this, from the western point of view, is that Communism has been handed a perfect setup for a flashy, impressive performance. If the Communists had to prove their precepts only by their works in such places as Bulgaria, it would take them a long time, if not forever, to construct a reasonably modern industrial state that could hope to compete with any of the modern industrial states of the West. The process of forcing peasants to become industrial workers is not easily achieved, as the Kremlin well knows. Superficial achievements, good enough for propaganda purposes, can be made. But Russian industrial products do not compete in world markets yet—nor do Bulgarian. Czechoslovakia is different. All the Communists had to do was seize it, then say, "See, it works."

It does work. Why shouldn't it? A provocative lesson one learns in Czechoslovakia today is this: Any big industry which was running when it was owned

by a corporation continues to run when it is taken over by the state. How long it will continue to run and how efficiently remain to be seen. Whether the government can keep industries like Skoda steel or Bata shoe machinery up with the competition in western Europe also remains to be seen. It will require ingenuity, foresight, innovation, and daring. But for the time being big business runs almost as it did before. As far as the individual worker is concerned, a corporation is just about as impersonal and remote as a government. In Czechoslovakia the worker soon learned that the state and the corporation are interested in precisely the same things—keeping production up and wages down.

There was a brief period after the coup—here they refer to it as "the events of February"—when the workers had an illusion that they could raise their own wages, and also take a hand in management. That has been all but dispelled. The shop committee has been told to leave management strictly alone. And wages are being steadily whittled down to their pre-"February events" level. So matters haven't changed very much.

Yes, it works. It could work better



than it does. Man-hour production would not satisfy an American plant manager—and doesn't, as a matter of fact, satisfy the Czech government or the Communist Party. They blame this on the slow-down practiced during the German occupation. Another reason is that raw materials arrive less regularly and in more varying quality than they did before the war. Czech industry will run better if and when the United States ends its present campaign of economic sanctions. The government and the party look forward eagerly to that event. During the blockade of Berlin many industrial workers were put on short working hours. Without raw materials, there wasn't anything else for them to do; and the state had promised security of employment. That can become expensive even for a state, and it has been.

Nonetheless, the Communists have a good window display here. The worker has some benefits he did not have before. One is security of employment. Another is a paid vacation at a hotel which in older days was reserved for the rich. Another is the lavish praise the worker receives from the propaganda machine. He is told that he is king. Perhaps he will begin to suspect that he has only traded one master for another. Perhaps some day he will decide that security

from arbitrary arrest is worth more than security from unemployment. But so far as I can discover he hasn't made that decision yet.

That brings us to another aspect of the matter. It is so easy for the Communists to keep a going concern going that they have not had to employ their police power in a way that touches the immediate daily lives of a majority of the people. The power is there. It shows. Perhaps it makes the average man shudder with apprehension occasionally. But it hasn't hurt him yet—not seriously. Possibly it will later. There are some indications that the secret police are even giving the other departments of government a few shudders. Some western observers here think that the police make some of their more spectacular arrests without consulting the ministries which can be injured by such acts. The sentencing of two American GI's as spies did not help the Czech Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade pry open the channels of American raw materials, which is something they have been frantically trying to do. But until now the police have not used their powers extravagantly. The Czechs are practicing passive submission—as they did under Austria for three hundred years.


So today there is little visible resistance from the workers. There is none to speak of from the farmers, although they are told almost daily that they are petty bourgeois, therefore enemies of the state, therefore scheduled for ultimate liquidation or incorporation in a collective. Still, those who talk with farmers say that so far they seem fairly well satisfied. And church resistance is not what it is cracked up to be because most Czech churches—those which

claim more than ninety per cent of all the communicants—are accustomed to living on government subsidies. These churches continue to receive their subsidies from the present government. The church budget this year is 351 million kronen—about \$7,020,000.

What of the future? That, I would think, depends very largely on one factor. If the nerve war slackens, and if the flow of raw materials to Czech industry returns to prewar normal, then there might be another prolonged period of submission. With production up there is no presently discernible reason why the regime should be unable to maintain a tolerable living standard, provided, of course, that nationalized industry can keep abreast of its western competition and that the police do not run berserk.

But suppose things do not work out that way. The Czech worker has been promised something pretty close to the millennium. He expects at least that his established living standard will be maintained. It is quite possible that even some of the top leaders of the government might become less enthusiastic if they should discover that what they are managing has become a real Russian-style tyranny. There isn't the slightest sign of Titoism in Czechoslovakia today. Resistance would probably never take that form. Czechs are not made of the stuff that produces Titos. But they are flexible rather than malleable. If the force bending them should relax they would probably spring back to their natural posture.

Very likely—but one won't find the Czechs in the advance guard of any great revolt against Moscow. It is said in Prague—perhaps unkindly—that if Tito should escape from Moscow, and if the Poles and Hungarians should try, and succeed, that then the Czechs would follow. —JOSEPH C. HARSCH





# Union of Europe?

*Britain's reservations and France's desire for continental hegemony are obstacles in the path of unification, says a European writer*

The idea of some sort of European union has, without any doubt, made serious progress on both sides of the Atlantic in these post-war years. While on the American side stress is placed, not unreasonably, on the economic importance of such a union, Europeans lay emphasis on its political, or defensive, angle. Face to face with Russia and its sphere of influence (quite apart from the factor of Communism), Europe is today in the same situation as it was once in regard to Genghis Khan or to the Ottoman Empire. That is, Europe, a small annex of the vast Continent of Asia, but rich in vitality, once again is materially and spiritually oppressed by the incalculable weight of a great, mysterious mass in the East.

Historically speaking, it is almost certain that Europe could not have stood its ground against Turkish pressure had it not been for the wealth and power derived from the exploitation of India and the opening up of the continent of America. It is amusing to draw a parallel between the defensive power of American economic aid today and that of the treasure of the Incas and Aztecs four centuries ago.

Nor could the Europeans have resisted the Turks in the fifteenth century without unity, just as today they must have a high degree of unity if they are to withstand the Russians. Right now the two main obstacles to European union are, first, the differing degrees of importance which different nations attach to its accomplishment, and, second, the conflict between national interests and those of a united continent. If we wish to see the problem as it is we must not underestimate these obstacles.

First, let us look at Britain. In the recent war the Germans were halted at the Channel, and the British still feel safer than the continentals—despite

their experience of air raids and the new fears that they might, quite naturally, have developed in the atomic age. Reason may tell the British that they are just as exposed as the French and Italians but they still instinctively feel that the sea will continue to protect them against invasion. Consequently, the British tend to consider the defense of Europe the business of other people rather than their own.

Britain is not the same kind of nation as France or Italy, to start with. It is the center of a little world of its own, Empire or Commonwealth, whichever you may choose to call it. Of course, France too has an empire, second in size only to that of the British, but it has always been less conscious of its imperial state. The fall of London during the recent war would have been a great blow, but the British would have considered it an episode in the struggle rather than a permanent defeat. As long as the rest of the Commonwealth holds out, Britain will never give itself up for lost. When Paris falls, France is done for.

Britain's imperial status creates a grave dilemma. Is it possible to bring the British Commonwealth into a European union? The answer, obviously, is no. If we are to deal in these terms the question would have to be put the other way around: We should ask ourselves whether Europe can be incorporated into the Commonwealth. The idea is not so strange as it may sound; indeed, it might be the perfect solution. But I doubt if either the British or their overseas partners are ready for anything so drastic. Europeans, I know very well, are not.

The question, then, is this. Can Britain enter into a European union while remaining at the same time the most important part, if not the center, of a

non-European Commonwealth? Theoretically speaking it can, but we must not blind ourselves to the enormous problems involved and the difficulties of their solution. However enthusiastic we may be about the idea of a united Europe, we must admit that in the place of the British we should think twice about it. It is only natural that they should hesitate to abandon the structure they have built up over the years, one that has served them well in spite of the frequent predictions of its destruction, in order to plunge into an organization which at the moment exists only on paper.

There is still another factor, a psychological one, whose importance we must not forget: Britain's current socialist experiment. The mighty effort to recast the nation's economic and social framework has met with success and richly deserved admiration. It looks as if the British were repeating the miracle they performed in the last century, as if they had found a political formula to enable them to make the transition from an outworn pattern to an up-to-date one without passing through violent revolution.

The results of recent local British elections are too contradictory for us to say whether or not the socialist tendency will prevail. On the continent, it is clear enough that the trend is definitely away from socialism. This fact irritates the British and makes them still more reluctant to cast their lot with that of Europe. They would be much more enthusiastic over a European union if more European countries were in socialist hands.

The position of France is just as complex. The French feel that their national existence is tied to that of the continent and they accuse the British,

with a good deal of reason, of thinking of the continent mainly in terms of evacuating it. Their aim, therefore, is to make the center of any union strictly continental and to banish even the thought of evacuation. Thus far all Europeans agree with them. But no farther.

It would be unjust to accuse the French of the same master-race complex as that of the Germans. But they are convinced that God has put the political, spiritual, and cultural leadership of Europe in their hands and that to lessen what they call *le rayonnement français* would be no less than heretical. They take it for granted that western Europe is a French domain; that Italy and the Benelux countries should gravitate around France; that while Germany may sometime enter this system it must never dominate it.

In Italy real and imaginary grievances have created a feeling of historical distrust as regards the French, yet there is less opposition than might be expected to the idea of a tie-up with France. The fiercest opposition comes, rather, from the Benelux countries, which have for centuries resisted French expansion and yet are not so sure today of their capacity for resistance as is Italy. The more France tries to make itself the center of a European union, which seems to the French a perfectly normal procedure, the more the Benelux group looks to Britain for protection. And the French, instead of seeing the natural cause of such behavior, blame it on British duplicity and the traditional British wish to maintain a balance of power.

Last but not least, there is the German problem. Neither the whole of Germany nor its western half yet belongs to the recently constituted Council of Europe, and there is only a vague prospect of its becoming a sort of associate member. But Germany's presence, like that of a ghost, is everywhere; it is almost more vivid as a threat than as a reality. The problem is too obvious to be dismissed or evaded. On economic, political, and military grounds it is abundantly clear that western Europe cannot become a living entity without German participation. Western Germany alone, with its forty-six million inhabitants, its industrial power and organizing ability, is potentially the strongest national unit of Europe.

That Germany, or at least its western half, must be admitted as soon as possible to the Council of Europe is more or less taken for granted. The only question is what Germany's position is to be. Left to its own devices, within two years Germany would be once more the strongest power on the continent. If all the other countries were closely grouped together—as is most unlikely—even their greater numerical strength could not hold up against German technical and economic efficiency. After the five years during which Europe lived in the shadow of German domination it is not surprising to find a widespread dread (to put it mildly) of such a possibility.

Some people say that the only answer is to make Germany more democratic, to convince its people that cooperation is more profitable than conquest. Very true, but this is more easily said than done. Germany's re-entry

into the European community can only be made acceptable gradually and through an elaborate system of controls. On the other hand, how long can the Germans be expected to put up with a position of inferiority? The problem in a nutshell is this: If there is any hope of persuading the Germans to cooperate sincerely and democratically with a European program it must be on the basis of equality. But starting out on an equal footing, Germany would soon outstrip the other European countries. These countries are worried, and show it, and this leads the Germans to the conclusion that they must either remain forever inferior or emerge again as conquerors.

The whole problem of European unity, then, materially speaking, is complex, and psychologically, even more so. Its complexity defies even the influence and prestige of America.

The United States has said clearly enough more than once that it wants Europe to unite. It is no exaggeration to say that without American influence we should never have witnessed the recent ratification of the statute of the Council of Europe, which, in spite of its faults, represents a great step ahead. The United States must appreciate the difficulties that stand in the way of its execution and tirelessly remind all the parties concerned of the importance of the goal toward which they are striving.

The French attitude, for instance, must be kept in mind, but it need not be given too much weight. As to Britain's participation, the main point is for the United States to refrain from complicating things any further. The



United States tells us to unite and to include Britain in our union, but Britain hangs back. If the United States is really convinced that British hesitation is uncalled for—which seems to me a rash conclusion—then it can put pressure on Britain to commit itself unreservedly to the continental effort. But if there is sufficient reason for the present British behavior, it would be better for the United States to concentrate its effort on Europe proper and let Britain make what connections it will with the continent, while at the same time preserving the Commonwealth. If Britain were free of the fear of excessive commitments, it might more easily be persuaded to further and strengthen the union of the continental nations among themselves. All in all, this seems wiser.

The German problem offers greater difficulties. The only chance of solving it lies in the assumption on the part of the United States of a definite role of guarantor and arbiter. Even the most pig-headed of Germans have surely learned something from the decisive intervention of the United States in the two world wars, and if they knew for a fact that any new German attempt at conquest would meet with armed American opposition they would not dream of disturbing the peace. A firm statement of this intention would allay the European dread of a German revival and strengthen the request of the U.S. that Germany be given equal rights in a European union.

Difficult as it may be to achieve European union, it is not impossible. But it is important that Americans should see the obstacles for what they are and not be taken in by vague generalities and window-dressing. There are no examples in history of a spontaneous union among nations. If Hitler had won the war he would have imposed his own idea of union, which was not a pretty one. Stalin doubtless entertains even more definite ideas along the same line. The United States does not have to imitate the aims or methods of either one, but the fact remains that it is the only power strong enough to make the newly-set-up Council of Europe a concrete reality. European men of good will may do their share, but without American backing they cannot achieve anything really effective.

—FLAVIUS

## Communist Comeback

*While the Right and Center fumble, the Left extends a helping hand to the poor, mixed-up French worker*

In the main yard of the Renault plant you see, row on row, faded denim jackets, soiled shirts, bare heads, intent eyes. Three speakers, one for each major trade union, are on a platform. The men scarcely stir. Here and there one of them lifts a *Gauloise bleue* or a weathered pipe. That is all.

Loudspeakers carry the Communist delegate's words to the far corners of the long rectangle. At his conclusion—"More than ever the essential of our struggle is unity"—he gets louder applause than the spokesman for the rival unions, but nothing tremendous. It is the applause of troubled men.

The rally breaks up swiftly, quietly. The workers' wage demands are not likely to be met now. There will be no strike—not with summer vacations just ahead. No militant display. No dramatic outbursts. No immediate hopes.

Yet this midday rally at Renault's is important; it is another step in the Communists' "unity of action" program, now progressing steadily among the much-divided French labor unions. The plan was originated by Benoît Frachon and the rest of the brain-trusters who run the *Confédération Générale du Travail*. It represents a complete reversal of the Communists' previous labor tactics. Party-line political action has given way to straight trade unionism. The CGT has a new

line: cooperation among all workers and syndicates.

In April a Communist leader in the north told the CGT miners: "Extend your hand to our comrades of the *Force Ouvrière* and *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*. If they sign on it, wipe it off and extend it again." These same miners, a year or so ago had been beating up some of these comrades of the FO and the CFTC. Today the Red labor lions conduct themselves as friendly pink rams—all interested in sheep, of course. To what ends and with what prospects?


The reason for the Communist about-face lies in the serious divisions of French unions, and the causes for these divisions. The Communists provoked the costly 1947-48 strikes for frankly political objectives desired by Moscow. They suffered a stinging, unexpected defeat. The political strikes split the powerful CGT wide open, made half of its membership withdraw, set off the formation of the anti-Communist *Force Ouvrière* under Léon Jouhaux, a veteran Socialist union leader, and strengthened the hand of the Catholic CFTC. Today in France there is a crazy pattern of rival unions. Accurate membership figures are virtually impossible to obtain. In addition the various unions carry large numbers on their rolls who can no longer afford to pay dues. This includes the Communists' CGT. The following approximations of relative union strength are unavoidably rough:

CGT (Communist controlled): 2,800,000 members.

*Force Ouvrière* (Anti-Communist): 750,000.

CFTC (Christian Workers Confederation): 750,000.

General Committee of Independent Syndicalists (*Vichyites*): 150,000.





FNSA (National Federation of Autonomous Syndicates): 150,000.

Other Independent Unions: 210,000.

Teachers' Unions: 100,000.

CNT (Anarchists): 50,000.

The non-Communist unions, then, have about 2.1 million members, or some seven hundred thousand less than the CGT. Before the split, CGT is said to have had about six million members. Of the three million who quit, perhaps half have shunned union membership ever since. These 1.5 million or more "abstentionists" and large numbers of other workers who do not belong to any union constitute the Communists' major target of today. If they can attract, or reattract, a majority of them into the CGT the Reds' power in French labor will be nearly doubled, will become crushingly dominant. This is the objective of "unity of action."

Its chances of success are heightened by the weak, old-fashioned quality of the Socialist-led FO. While the CFTC stubbornly holds its own, the FO first failed to carry off more than a fraction of the bolters from the CGT. It has lost membership notably in the past year. Great numbers of bolters turned away from all of the organized unions in disgust.

French workers are severely hit by the high cost of living, yet the Paris government has taken no concerted action to bring prices down. Recently, working hours have been reduced in many factories. Part-time employment grows, accentuating the workers' hard lot. Some factories are now on a twenty-four-hour week. Many chemical plants are on thirty hours or less. Reduction of six hours in the working week has been imposed in steel plants. Both part-time employment and the fear of unemployment are increasing. In the Paris industrial districts—Billancourt and St. Denis—these conditions make workers' faces grave.

The average French laborer has to spend his entire wages for one week in order to buy a pair of shoes, almost an entire month's income to buy a suit. At the Panhard plant in Paris, Gaston says he buys one suit a year, but Gaston is a bachelor and gets an annual pension of forty-five thousand francs for his war injuries. Auguste, at St. Denis, protests: "It's two years since I could buy a suit. One cannot dress decently."

"How much of your wages do you spend for food?"

"Eighty per cent, Monsieur." (On this point everyone agrees.)

Georges, gray-haired and seamy-faced, says: "Before the war we spent ten per cent of our wages on food. Now it is eighty per cent." Madame Jeaneau, plump and bespectacled, looks indestructible and has a glint in her dark eyes: "Now there is everything in the shops—but we can buy nothing. Certainly, others can buy. But we workers—nothing."

"But the Marshall Plan? Has it brought you no improvement?"

"To be frank, Monsieur, it has brought no change in our lives."

"It is true. . . . It is like she says."

A technician in a gray apron interjects: "If we workers could recover the standard of living of 1936, then the Communists would lose three-quarters of their following in France."

You understand the serious faces at the Renault plant rally more clearly now. You see why the Communists have their new rallying cry, "unity of action." They began late last winter, and really got going in the spring. The Communists seek any sort of excuse for cooperation among the syndicates. The process is usually like this:

"Why are there no separate showers for women in this plant?" a Communist organizer asks. "It's a disgrace. Let us act together. Our women must have showers." At first anti-Communist workers can scarcely believe their ears—the idea of Communists not talking politics seems incredible. But the tactic has worked. By reasonable claim or exaggerated pretext the CGT shop leaders succeed in creating a joint committee with CFTC, FO, or other syndicate units in their plant—always on some specific objective. Once established, other claims keep the committee going. Since March, cooperation between Communist and anti-Communist unions has developed notably in France.

"Unity of action" may start the Communists off on a comeback in

## French Labor Unions

Membership in millions

2.8

2.6

2.4

2.2

2.0

1.8

1.6

1.4

1.2

1.0


.8

.6

.4

.2

.0



the working class. The workers are tired and still suspicious, a surprising number of French workers have become indifferent to politics and trade unions alike, but there is more and more shop-level cooperation in key industries and plants.

The Renault plant, which is the largest in the Paris region, employs 33,000 or more. Before the split nearly half of its workers belonged to the CGT. After that the CGT was reduced to some 4,500 members; the FO corralled 2,000 anti-Communists; the Catholic CFTC 1,500. But recently the CGT regained 1,200 new members in five weeks, while the FO in the same plant reputedly lost 800. "Unity of action" has also progressed not-

ably in such Paris plants as Citroën, Rosengart, and Alstom. It played the major role in the Metro workers' recent demands for wage increases. These tactics continued to gain ground across France. Pierre Le Brun, secretary of the CGT, makes no fancy claims. He merely says that membership "has increased for several months."

No alert or sincere union leader can disregard the wretchedness of the French workers today. This is why the CFTC, spurred by its left wing, cooperates more and more with the CGT in defending workers' interests. Catholic and Communist unionists participate in joint committees in such industries as textiles, steel, chemicals, and shoe manufacturing. In some shops the lower echelons in non-Communist syndicates accept "unity of action" against the wishes of their chiefs.


In the CGT the Communists possess the strongest labor organization in France. They have the ablest, most dynamic and flexible leaders, the best propagandists, and quantities of energetic younger men at all levels. They interest themselves particularly in the lowest-paid, hardest-hit workmen. Vast numbers of French workers remain rightly skeptical of Communist motives. But as the CGT becomes the first or most ardent champion of their rights and needs, the suspicions (and memories) of many fade perceptibly. The longer French labor is the victim of high prices, government inaction, and part-time employment, the more influence the Communists stand to gain.

A big reason why the Communists are gaining ground is, of course, the opposition—or indifference—of the French workers to the Marshall Plan. They have just enough money for food, and almost none for anything else, so it is difficult for them to see how the ERP has contributed to French recovery. However, the bald fact is that without the Marshall Plan there would be very little work in France, and even less food than there is now. Under the ECA Act, it is the duty of the French government to explain the advantages of the plan to the people, but so far it has done a thoroughly inadequate job.

By shifting their emphasis to straight unionism the Communists have become the foremost crusaders for the French working class. The government's failure to treat labor's needs on a par with those of farmers and other

favoured groups plays directly into the Communists' hands. They now stand at least a good chance of rising from the disaster of the political strikes to a greater dominance of French unionism than ever before. Meanwhile the other parties have neither courted labor nor bestirred themselves to give the workers a better deal.

A popular front of trade unions—not political at the moment but potentially extremely so—is in the making in France. If it sweeps on and wins sixty or seventy-five per cent of French syndicalists, what then? Under certain circumstances, such as emergence of a



de Gaulle government after the next elections, it would be easy to lead the popular front into politics.

Monsieur Racine, secretary general of the independent Autonomous Syndicates (FNSA), says: "I fear the Communists will gain much more. They will win a dominant control unless a new confederation of all anti-Communist French workers is organized." Until recently this opinion does not appear to have been shared by General de Gaulle's closest advisers. As yet the General has made no boldly-conceived bid for the support of the workers. His proposal in September, 1948, of an "association of labor, capital, and management" was much too vague, floating high over the heads of the laboring masses.

In-between unionists say, "De Gaulle has offered nothing real to us." But the de Gaullists show increasing concern about getting a labor following. They may yet produce a much more appealing program. Oddly enough, if a de Gaullist labor movement gets going, the so-called Vichyite syndicalists (numerically small) are generally regarded as potential collaborators; likewise the white-collar Christian unions—but not the bulk of workers in the Catholic CFTC. Is de Gaulle really washed up with French labor? A pru-

dent observer replies: "Hitler was also washed up in 1932."

Nevertheless it is the Communists who have taken the offensive and are way out in front. They alone assiduously court some 1,500,000 to 2,500,000 "abstentionists," waverers, and non-union workers. They are the most expert at propaganda and organization. The CGT controls the unions in steel, railroads, the mines, gas, and electricity. It is gaining in other industries.

Autumn and winter is strike-time in France. Unless prices are brought down by then, demands for wage increases are inevitable. Recent demands, originated by the Communists, are merely warming-up exercises. The French workers' need for greater purchasing power is indisputable. The bases of their discontent are highly justifiable. There are presently strong reasons, then, to expect serious strike waves in France any time from October into next spring.

What would happen if the Communists, fighting the Marshall Plan, were in position to unleash chain-reaction strikes across most of the French economy? French production might well be paralyzed. To be in a position to do this the Communists must have a pronounced majority of French workers, aroused and spurred by severely punishing conditions, behind them. These conditions already exist. The necessary situation is developing.

Of course, the outcome depends on important imponderables—whether part-time employment increases, whether a deepening U.S. recession decreases American purchases and increases unemployment throughout western Europe, whether a tolerable truce emerges soon between East and West, whether Moscow's international situation requires that French Communists should revert to using strikes for frankly political purposes—or whether the CGT is permitted to stick to a program of "unity of action" and straight defense of the workers' interests.

One fact merits heavy underscoring. The French Communists' comeback could scarcely obtain greater impetus from Moscow's decisions than it would receive from any serious accentuation of the recession in the United States. The Communists' labor offensive in France is perfectly timed.

—OUR EUROPEAN EDITOR

# No Melting Pot, But a Caldron

*Were the recent, bloody riots in Durban between Indians and Zulus fostered by whites who feared the oppressed might some day unite?*

In Durban, South Africa, last January 13, a Hindu fruit dealer slapped a Zulu child. This led to remonstrations, blows, armed rioting, looting, and application of the torch. In two days, fifty Indians, eighty-seven Africans, and one European were killed, and 1,087 people, including thirty-two whites, were wounded. Three factories, 710 stores, and 1,532 dwellings were shattered or damaged.

What caused this explosion of hate? There are, of course, Communists in South Africa, but, as the conservative London *Observer* remarked, this was "perhaps the first serious riot of modern times for which the Communists have not and cannot be blamed." Nor, to be fair, can the blame be put exclusively on Prime Minister D. F. Malan and his Nationalist Party, or shifted to Malan's political opponent, Field Marshal J. C. Smuts. Finally, nothing can be more absurd than the report of a typically *Afrikaans* commission of inquiry, which said that the rioters were motivated by "ill-informed" champions of the natives, who "din into their heads that they have grievances." The natives do not need dinning to know

that they have many grievances.

The riot was not really caused by individuals, but by economic conditions. To understand them, we have to go back to the first mass immigration of the Indians into South Africa. About 1860, when conditions in India were intolerable and the sugar plantations of Natal were hard up for cheap labor, the first Indians came to South Africa as indentured workers. The plantations kept on bringing them as the early-comers moved on to other industries. The bait included a free passage back to India, or a free plot of land.

Some did get their land; others saved up for and bought the plots they had hoped to get; and, between them, these groups did what the Japanese were to do later in California. Within a generation Indian farmers virtually monopolized certain crops—especially corn, tobacco, and garden produce—and grew prosperous enough to enter the merchant class in considerable force.

The whites, the small farmers and traders in particular, became alarmed. The Bantu (South African Negroes), who were now fleeced by the Indians as well as oppressed by the whites, grew hostile. Anti-Indian movements, pressing for repatriation or segregation, went into action. In 1893, the right to vote in Parliamentary elections was taken away from the Indians. Three years later serious anti-Indian riots shook the provincialism of Durban. In 1913, South Africa passed an Act forbidding further immigration from India. In 1922 and 1923 restrictive covenants were endorsed by legislation, and an Anti-Asiatic League was formed. In 1924 Indians were denied the municipal franchise, and in 1927 arrangements were made with the British administration in India to accelerate repatriation. In 1943 the "Pegging"

Act froze the status of Indians according to their economic position at that time. Three years later, the "Ghetto Act" (the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act) prevented Indians from buying in certain areas.

The passage of this law produced a wave of boycotts by Indians, which had wide repercussions in the Union of South Africa and the international scene. The Prime Minister of India wrote Smuts probably the most severe letter he ever had received; the Indian government recalled its High Commissioner in South Africa; and the United Nations Assembly rebuked the Union.

Jawaharlal Nehru now called for united action by Indians and Africans—another expression of his basic political philosophy, which has produced the Inter-Asian Conferences and the action taken by his government on behalf of the Indonesians.

These appeals fitted in with the thinking of progressive South African Indians, as well as some Bantu and Cape Colored (a mixture of white, Asiatic, and colored). They were already part of a national non-European movement in South Africa, with its own press and public platforms. In this growing unity, and the possibility that it would get official support from India, a major cause of the January riots resides. That cause is fear. For, in







South Africa, there are 7.7 million Africans, .9 million Cape Colored, a quarter of a million Indians, about thirty thousand other Asiatics, and 2.3 million Europeans. In other words, there are almost four times as many non-Europeans as whites, and of these non-Europeans the Indians are politically and economically the strongest.

Therefore, it is widely believed, even in South Africa, that the whites deliberately provoked riots to undermine the economic advantages of Indians, as well as their political solidarity with Africans. Press photographs show Europeans and European-owned cars in the riots, and there are reports that whites helped Africans loot Indian shops and houses. It is known, too, that some Africans were taken to the rioting zones in trucks driven by Europeans.

Yet this direct incitement was relatively unimportant. The indirect incitements of sixty years of anti-Indian campaigning, winding up with the recent electioneering propaganda of the Nationalist Party, were much more responsible for the release of African tensions. Malan had called for "Zululand for the Zulus." The Bantu were to join with the whites in driving out the oppressive Indians.

Senator Edgar Brooks, who represents Africans in the South African Senate and is Chairman of the South African Institute of Race Relations, was one of many liberal whites who saw the deeper explanations for the explo-

sion. Speaking in Cape Town on January 19, he said:

"Much of the responsibility for what has happened rests on those Europeans who have fanned anti-Asiatic feeling in Durban and made of it in recent years a city of hate. . . . The greatest tension existed between the poorer and more ignorant Zulus and the middle-class Indians. As always happens in riots, the innocent suffered with the guilty. Many of the Indian refugees were of the poorest and most wretched strata of society, whom no one could call exploiters. . . ."

Nevertheless, the most fundamental cause of the riots, as Senator Brooks suggests, should not be sought only in "racial" fears and hatreds, nor in the incitement of blacks by whites, but in the merciless exploitation of the Africans. It is reflected in a single fact. The Africans constitute seventy per cent of the population, but own only eight per cent of the land. The whites who own most of the land have put barely five per cent to its proper productive use.

The Africans are disfranchised, segregated, paid poorly, taxed heavily, housed shamefully, and educated miserably. They are riddled with infectious and nutritional diseases, and subjected to all the refinements of indignity and repression. This has been said many times, but little or nothing has been done about it.

For people in such conditions the periodic release of pent-up hate is practically a necessity. And the Indians,

themselves the victims of discrimination, provide an obvious target. They are few and unarmed. They are relatively successful in spite of their disabilities. They have compensated for the deprivation of the right to free competition by unscrupulous practices directed against the African, both as a competitor and a customer. They have clung to the preferential treatment, and put on parlormaid airs, inevitable where another group is still more underprivileged. But their behavior is as much conditioned by economic pressures as African resentment against it. It should not be regarded so superficially that it obscures the ultimate responsibility of white supremacy.

Fortunately, that is realized in South Africa itself. In its issue for February, 1949, a Johannesburg monthly, *Common Sense*, sharply criticized those papers "which could not resist the temptation to imply that the Indians themselves had largely contributed to, if they had not provoked, this outbreak by their commercial conduct toward the Africans. This is a detestable attitude. If the black market and sharp practices generally have prevailed, whose duty was it to discover and stop them? For years past successive Governments have failed to protect the poorest buyers from being overcharged. They cannot now evade the responsibility for this negligence by reproaching the race of one set of storekeepers. Every group in South Africa has its discreditable elements; the difference is that what passes as high finance in one is recognized as low cunning in another. . . ."

An understanding of the basic issues involved gives the January riots a larger significance than that of a deeply regrettable local incident. It has renewed the efforts of non-European South Africans to unite. It reveals again the bitter fruits of racial policies and social injustice. It serves as a warning of what may happen next time. For, under conditions prevailing in South Africa, there will sooner or later be a next time, though non-Europeans might then require more direct satisfactions than violence against substitutes can afford. And in that next time, whatever its direction, the rising nationalisms of Asia and the rest of the colored world will be intimately interested.

—CEDRIC DOVER

# The Magic Broom in East Africa

You learn a new word, and immediately you see it everywhere. A new idea swims into your ken, and you find everywhere phenomena that seem to be related to it. AFRICA, MID-EAST LURE OUR CAPITAL you read in a newspaper, and the headline is made significant by the memory of President Truman's "bold, new program." Had the President not said what he did, I should never have read *The Sorcerer's Apprentice* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1948. 18 shillings), Elspeth Huxley's record of five months' intensive inspection of East Africa.

*The Sorcerer's Apprentice* is a sufficiently admonitory title. Britain, the sorcerer, has put the magic broom into the hands of the East African native—that is, has started development schemes in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. The native, the apprentice, has got hold of the broom but doesn't know how to control it. What will be the outcome of the experiment in this "turbulent and groping age which is rolling over Africa"?

Mrs. Huxley was born in Africa. Her first concern is not precisely to forward British interests, but she is tender of the feelings of the British settlers in the East African highlands, she does not coddle the native, she tends to sniff at Roman Catholic missionary efforts, and her attitude toward the cost of the development bill is reminiscent of Congressman Taber's attitude toward the ECA.

So much said, this is a brilliant example of first-hand reporting on Mrs. Huxley's part, a socio-economic Baedeker filled with facts that are often curious and always seem to be trustworthy, skillful sketches of personalities, vivid descriptions of varied countryside, wonderfully entertaining stories of men and beasts.

Elspeth Huxley must be one of the ablest reporters living today. Arab, Indian, black, or Britisher, government

official, missionary, rancher, or trader—no man escapes without answering her questions; and she has prepared herself so conscientiously that almost every one of her sixty reports is a neatly-wrapped, satisfying whole.

At the same time, however, the book suffers from monotony and repetition, as even the best reporting must when it runs to 366 pages without concern for structure and synthesis. Lacking a "summary and conclusion," it leaves the many-tongued individual facts to speak in a confusing chorus for themselves.


There are two East Africas in the book: its fifty-seven photographs are divided between shots of the old Africa—a pride of lions, a herd of hippos, Masai warriors, and so on—and the new Africa—bulldozers clearing brush, a school for native children, a cotton-ginning mill, model housing on a tea estate, a chief in Savile Row clothes, a black clerk of court.

Indirectly, the second lot of photos symbolizes the problem with which the book deals. Our twentieth-century man, whose spiritual decay the Western world is lamenting, does not exterminate Indians as was once done with the approval of the priests who accompanied Cortez and the dominies of our "manifest destiny" age; he no longer mutilates and brutalizes blacks rounded up to tap rubber trees or dig gold a mile under the earth as in the day of God-fearing Leopold of Belgium and Rhodes of England—and his job is made no easier by reason of his godless humanitarianism. The problem is not exploitation or development; the problem (as our South knows) is to combine development with respect for the human personality.

We use words like "underdeveloped" and "backward" without always considering their relativity. Presumably the ARAMCO oil man in Saudi Arabia

thinks himself among a backward people; yet the desert Arabs have at least always known what irrigation is—and of this the East African knows nothing. We imagine the Gold Coast blacks to be savages; but the Gold Coast blacks make excellent artisans, clerks, accountants—and the East Africans do not. We think of the American tribespeople as primitive; but, as Mrs. Huxley says, "The natives of these [East African] regions have produced, so far as is known, no permanent architecture, no carved figures, idols or masks, no textiles; they have not even experimented with the shapes and decoration of earthenware pots."

Yet (like Americans trying to make democrats out of Germans) the government imposes the non-vocational



curriculum of English grade schools upon children who step almost literally through Alice's looking-glass when they come into a schoolroom; they lay down English rules of evidence when they try and acquit a witch-doctor for self-confessed murder; they refuse to interfere with the movement of native prostitutes to the towns because that would mean that they had "infringed the liberty of the subject."

On the other hand they mystify the native by fining him for cutting down the "wrong" trees and killing the "wrong" birds and animals. Doubtless



they know best; but it was not a proponent of tyranny, it was John Stuart Mill, who wrote in his essay *On Liberty*: "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one."

Or, as a British official in Tanganyika puts it, "We are asking too much of the Native Authorities. Take this destocking (of cattle), and measures to stop soil erosion. . . . The best chiefs say to me: 'These rules are your measures, not ours. We personally see the point of them, but most people don't. We can't get them with us. Why don't you give the orders yourselves? The people would grumble but they'd obey. Are we to have our houses burnt down because we must harry the people to do the Government's bidding?'"

Of course every corner of the world is not like East Africa. But we may be sure in advance that when we go into an underdeveloped region we shall run into snags unforeseen by those who imagine that American ways *must* be welcome wherever they are imported. The more politically advanced the native is, the harder he may be to deal with. Mrs. Huxley quotes an official report to the effect that an educated African objected to native cooperatives on the ground that they were an "attempt to keep the African in the herd; the European and the Asian was usually an individualist, and the African wished to be an individualist, too." She says of the regulation in Tanganyika against selling alcoholic drinks to natives, "a law passed in one generation

to prevent Europeans from exploiting Africans by selling them cheap intoxicants, is resented by the next as an instance of racial discrimination." African "nationalists," she says, sabotage farm aid for political reasons. They say to the peasants, "Don't listen to the Europeans who tell you to plant grass and kill your old cows. Don't you know why they say this? Because they want to seize the lands themselves! Don't you know why they want to build dips [to wash cattle clean of ticks]? So that dips will be ready for the settlers when they evict you!" Circumstances in other parts of the world will not be identical with these; but, particularly since the spread of the Cominform's "agitprop" training, wherever we go we shall find a local intelligentsia expressing itself as Mrs. Huxley reports the Kenya African Union to do: "its slogans are the canons of social justice in other lands."

I am bound to say, meanwhile, that whereas it appears unquestionable that the British government officials are handling the natives with extraordinary liberality, the contrary must be said for the business and planting world—Indian, Arab, and British. In the city of Nairobi, nearly four-fifths of the African population are males. These common laborers are there without their wives because their wages are not high enough to allow their families to live without the supplies of food which their hard-working wives produce on the *shamba*.

The picture she paints of East Africa is of a sometimes beautiful but almost always eroded and exhausted land, assailed by the tsetse fly and doubly overpopulated. Not only are there too many humans, there are too many cattle; and the land is so poor, the water drains out of it so rapidly, the grazing is so thin, that the cattle are meager and stunted and next to useless as food. To reduce their num-

bers drastically is difficult; fundamentally because the "bride price" is paid in cattle, and as it is the women who do the farming, the more wives the polygamous native has, the more leisure he has to get drunk daily on home brew.

"To trap and hold the scanty and badly distributed rainfall" and "to make Africans practice what scientists preach"—these are the two great problems. The first cannot be solved until the second is; and the second has hardly begun to be.

With or without the native's cooperation, development is going ahead. Under British government guidance, and largely at the British taxpayer's expense, it takes every form. In Gogoland (Tanganyika), the government's Overseas Food Corporation is spending the equivalent of \$100 million to clear three million acres of bush for the growing of groundnuts from which margarine will be produced. "No one really knows what will emerge from that ocean of thorns: health or sickness, fertility or desert, good soil or bad." As for water, "that is a vital point on which too little is known." Around Makueni, in Kenya, twelve hundred native families will be settled on land freed of the tsetse fly (it is hoped) at a cost of four hundred pounds a family, but "nothing will come out of Makueni for the use of the outside world." In Kavirondo Province a Development and Reconstruction Authority is spending fifteen million pounds on a ten-year plan of land and crop improvement and agricultural training, with the brave hope also of creating real village life embracing social halls, sports, crafts, cottage industries—things unknown to these villageless peoples. Elsewhere a government farm is trying to breed a bigger and better strain of cattle for the manly stock-thieves of the unruly Nandi tribe, and trying at the same

time to put some of these warriors through a two-year course in dairying.

These examples of rural development could be multiplied indefinitely, and all are unquestionably in the native's interest. From the Point Four aspect, however, they are disappointing in that they offer little promise of creating surpluses for export; their central purpose is to raise a seriously deficient standard of living of thirteen





million people. It is true, of course, that as these peoples grow in health they will grow in mental—and, more important, in moral—capacity.

Apart from the poverty of the land, the clearest impression that survives a reading of *The Sorcerer's Apprentice* is that of peoples who lack the moral stamina to do a day's work. Only here and there does success attend the government's efforts. The whole story is sadder than our somewhat inhumanly severe author seems to recognize. She writes at one point: "At Bundibugyo, you might have slipped back twenty years. This is Africa as it used to be, its people . . . riddled no doubt with horrible diseases and cruel superstitions . . . nevertheless, for reasons which remain obscure, infinitely more given to laughter and the joy of life than the generation that is superseding them—a generation of young men better dressed, better informed and with far wider opportunities, but so often half-crushed, it would seem, under the weight of their knowledge of double-entry and vitamins and electoral representation."

Perhaps this is the answer. The black, whom everyone acknowledges to be quick to learn, but whom every teacher, official, plantation foreman, factory owner, despairs of persuading to work hard enough, long enough, disinterestedly enough, to earn more than bare subsistence, to "better himself," may feel stubbornly and obscurely that there is something wrong about a system which wipes the smile from his face and takes the joy out of life. If we are to believe Mrs. Huxley, he never asked to be incorporated into our system; and even the overpopulation in humans and cattle may be the white man's fault: "Like a blundering rhino horned with the desire for good, the white man charged on to the scene. He made war on death . . . Men were protected against epidemics, tribal warfare and starvation"—and tribal populations doubled in twenty-five years, and with them the numbers of their progressively degenerated cattle.

This is beyond question a book against which officials concerned with Point Four could check some of the schemes which interested parties are perhaps already putting up to them. While it is thus a useful book, it is also one that the general reader will enjoy.

—LEWIS GALANTIERE

## Reader Contributions

These letters are in response to the first theme question, *What do you think can be done to improve the American public's knowledge of foreign affairs?*

### Conscience and Consciousness

To the Editor:—If we desire to improve the American public's knowledge of foreign affairs we must overcome its indifference and lethargy. The public must be brought to realize that there is a dynamic relationship between foreign and domestic affairs. Its stake is a personal one.

It is my thought that to do this the American public needs a new, one-world concept from which to view these matters. This world is one body and the idea of any divisibility exists only in the minds of the fatuous. We cannot separate ourselves from the reverberant reactions of foreign events. A famine in Asia, a revolt in South America, an election in Europe—no matter the nature of the change—all have eventual domestic influence. . . . To improve the public's knowledge of foreign affairs we must awaken a public consciousness.

But the question is only partly answered, for public conscience as well as consciousness is involved here. It is not enough to give this consciousness stimulus. It must also be given direction.

Relative to the need for direction there exists today with respect to the Marshall Plan a somewhat popular contention that the money being spent in Europe is being wasted on thankless, undeserving, and selfish peoples. This all-too-prevalent attitude is contrary to democratic principles. Aside from the obvious practical aspects of helping these less fortunate peoples to rehabilitate themselves there are the moral ones. Christianity teaches the concept that we are our brothers' keepers, that no man is an isle unto himself. These precepts hold true for nations too. . . .

What can be done to improve the public's knowledge of foreign affairs? We can bring the public to the realization that foreign affairs bear practical and dynamic implications for it, and that consideration of these implications must stem from the moral obligation we have to our fellow men.

JOHN DELISE  
New York

### The World Is Our Worry

To the Editor:—The American public's knowledge of foreign affairs and its interest in our foreign policy vary in direct proportion to the desire of the people to keep abreast of current news reports from other

sections of the globe. This attentiveness, in turn, depends in large degree on how closely an event in some distant country can be associated with the general welfare of the American individual and the whole nation.

If the people of this nation are to become policy-conscious and educated in international affairs, a more pointed method of news dissemination must be instituted to illustrate in basic terms just why threat of revolution in Bolivia, or a strike of west-German railway workers in Berlin, is not merely an incident experienced by total strangers halfway around the world, but an occurrence which may, at some future date, affect their own lives. In a world where the distance between continents is measured in flying hours, Americans must accept the fact that they are slowly but surely acquiring new and heretofore mostly ignored "neighbors" whose back yards spread to every corner of the planet. . . .

When the American public is ready to accept the world as its concern, then it will be on the road to effective formulation of policy.

HIRAM C. NAJARIAN  
Beaver, Pennsylvania

### Don't Expect Too Much

To the Editor:—I think the principal reason why we, as a public, know so little about foreign affairs is that we just cannot keep up with all that we are told about them. I think we are told too much. . . . Most of us want to be well-informed, but very few are willing to take the time and trouble to inform ourselves. So we are willing to accept at face value the predigested and oversimplified summaries of a columnist or a radio commentator. But we are not content to take just one man's report and study it. We take the boiled-down statements of four or six or a dozen summarizers, each of whom may have devoted years to the background and hours of preparation for each of his daily utterances; and if we believe we really understand what he has written, we are just deluding ourselves.

Our knowledge of foreign affairs can be improved if we can be convinced, first, that it is important to us individually to improve our knowledge, and, second, that it is not a matter that can be accomplished by a hurried reading or a semi-attentive listening to the radio, but that it requires genuine study and thought.

Magazine editors can help by limiting the

scope of each article published. Short, simple presentations are helpful. Editors should not expect to find readers who are capable of giving intelligent attention to a long article that covers a wide territory. Limit each article to one phase or one aspect of a single question. It helps a lot to have a summary or outline at the beginning of an article; not just a one-sentence statement of what the article discusses, but an authentic condensation or abstract. It helps, too, to include a glossary of abstruse or unfamiliar terms, especially foreign phrases. And it would help to have a "cast of characters" if names of individuals are used in an article. There must be hundreds of prominent people who are referred to almost daily in the newspapers; the writer of each article knows, presumably, just who the people he names are, but editors should not expect readers to keep in mind all those personalities and their titles and affiliations. If we can recognize the names of a dozen of the most famous, we're doing pretty well. . . .

My suggestion, then, is to simplify the matter for the reader. In a single article put only as much as can be assimilated by, say, a high-school graduate in not more than a half-hour. Keep the style simple: not jerky, short sentences necessarily, nor even a seriously abbreviated vocabulary; but a style that avoids long sentences with cumbersome clauses. And if the article mentions people by name, by all means tell us, in one way or another, who those people are.

KENNETH M. COLLINS  
New York

### *False Anonymity*

To the Editor:—Since language, written and spoken, is so generally debased a tool that it can scarcely convey precise meanings from one mind to another, I urge, first and last, semantic discipline. Especially, isn't it obvious that verbal lunacy afflicts us worse in respect to "foreign affairs" than in any other cluster of ideas? Indeed, what fact lies behind the term itself, and do any such animals really exist? For if we know anything as true, we know that the human race is *one* family, interdependent, and that prime devotion to any particular sovereign "state" therein organized is treason to mankind and suicide.

Nevertheless, I don't ask *The Reporter* to preach world government. I here recommend but this small step: Let each editor of, and each contributor to, *The Reporter* (and every editor, every columnist, every copywriter on every other publication) immediately resolve that he will never again use the terms "informed quarters," "authoritative sources," "official circles," "government spokesmen," or any other such term. Let this resolution carry with it the solemn responsibility to identify by name and job every person who makes a statement upon "foreign affairs" for publication. Let there be an end of anonymity, evasion, circumlocutions, and conscious distortions. You and I will then have at least a better chance to think clearly on the subject.

RICHARD H. SHUFFLEBARGER  
Martinsville, Indiana

## The Reporter

220 EAST 42nd STREET  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

### *Dear Reader:*

We asked you to comment on a theme, and your answers, from many sections of the country, flowed back to us in such number and were so thoughtful and interesting, that they crowded our usual Letters-to-the-Editor columns right out of this issue. We cannot let that happen all the time. Henceforth, in each issue, we shall provide space for the best replies to the theme question. Of course, our correspondents on other subjects will always have the opportunity—which we gladly give them—to criticize, argue, and propose. We want to be in ever closer contact with our readers and, since they are spread throughout this country and abroad, this means that we want them to write to us, to send us their own "reports" whether or not these concern the question of the week.

For those who wish to comment on a matter of some importance the theme this time is:

*What should be the role of  
organized labor in politics?*

And here are the instructions:

1. All reader contributions should state the question to which the letter is in answer.
2. Letters should not exceed five hundred words.
3. Contributors are asked to print name, address, and occupation.
4. Contributions should be addressed to Reader Contributions, *The Reporter*, 220 East 42 Street, New York 17, New York.
5. Contributions to be printed will be selected by The Editors.
6. Each contributor whose letter is printed will receive a check for \$25.00.
7. All contributions whether printed or not, will become the property of *The Reporter*.
8. All contributions on this issue's question must be postmarked not later than July 12, 1949.

Reader contributors are asked to follow instructions carefully in order to avoid confusion between contributions on the theme-question and regular Letters to the Editor.

*The Editors*

